Afghanistan’s fate hangs in balance

By S.P.SETH

The situation in Afghanistan is getting murkier and more dangerous by the day. After having received a dressing down by President Barack Obama during his recent flying visit to Afghanistan, the Afghan President Hamiz Karzai is acting a bit weird by simultaneously playing different cards in a game of diplomatic poker.

Having failed, through other high level US channels to impress on Karzai the gravity of the situation in his own country from high level corruption involving his family and henchmen, the US President Obama made a personal dash to deliver this serious message.

Karzai decided to counter-attack by accusing the US and its allies of acting like an invading force. He cautioned that If they continued with their interference, this has the potential of expanding the Taliban-led insurgency into a national resistance movement.

He was more explicit at a meeting of Afghan parliamentarians who are refusing to be his compliant agents by denying him arbitrary powers. Karzai reportedly told them, “if you and the international community pressure me more, I swear that I am going to join the Taliban.”

Of course, Karzai’s spokesman, has denied that such a comment was ever made and said that his boss was shocked to see this in media outlets. Reacting to this, the US is reportedly considering withdrawing an invitation to Hamid Karzai to meet President Obama in Washington next month.

The situation is further complicated by a recent war of words between Peter Galbraith, a former deputy head of the UN mission in Afghanistan. It might be recalled that Galbraith, among others, had accused Karzai of stealing the Presidential election in Afghanistan through massive fraud of the votes cast.

In a replay of the election controversy, Karzai recently accused the international community, and Galbraith in particular as UN representative, of “massive fraud” during last year’s presidential election.

Galbraith responded by effectively casting doubt on Karzai’s mental stability, apparently compounded by his “fondness for some of Afghanistan’s most profitable exports”--- meaning he is prone to drug abuse.

All these exchanges might not be so important but for the high stakes for Afghanistan’s future.

President Obama’s administration, with its new counter-insurgency strategy, is seeking to bring about some stability in Afghanistan. The new strategy, by committing another 30,000 US troops, is aimed at defeating the Taliban in their strongholds, securing these areas, installing effective local administration, foster economic development, and protect population centers.

In the process, the US will also train a large number of Afghan troops and police to take over from the US troops when they start withdrawing from Afghanistan around the middle of next year.

The US-led military operations against the Taliban-held town of Marjah in Helmand province was the starting point. And it was hailed as a great success, with a good deal of self-congratulation.

But this soon was toned down as the Taliban, having retreated against overwhelming force, continued to exercise enough authority and control through their shadowy existence. And now they are casting off their shadowing existence and returning to reassert control.

By his own admission, General Stanley McChrystal, US commander of Afghan operations and father of the new military strategy has reportedly said that “the insurgency has gotten to where it threatens more people, more hours of the day.”

The US is now counting on its planned major military offensive against the Taliban in their heartland of the Kandahar province. But President Karzai is not making this task easy by playing political footsie with the Taliban and the province’s tribal elders.

He is having negotiations with the Taliban for their induction into the political process, and has told the tribal elders that “there will be no operations until you are happy.”

In other words, Karzai will use his presidential authority to veto the US military operations already well advanced in planning to appease his Taliban compatriots.

The US has no problem negotiating with the Taliban but only after they have been comprehensively defeated.

Karzai is aware that he has exhausted the goodwill of his international backers, and is, therefore, constantly sending mixed signals to the United States about his ultimate loyalty.

His loyalty is only assured if the US and its European allies get off his back about corruption and effective governance and let him run Afghanistan his own way, but with continued US economic and military commitment.

Indeed, he was expecting to be the US’ approved protégé/dictator like other similar allies in different parts of the world; though with the usual, but meaningless, mutterings of democracy. He had a chummy relationship with President George Bush, with a friendly weekly teleconference. At the time, Bush was simply interested in blasting Iraq.

But things seemed to be changing under President Obama. For Obama, while Iraq was a war of choice under Bush presidency, the US military involvement in Afghanistan was a case of necessity. He, therefore, wanted results to bring about stability and a functioning democratic polity.

This is a tall order in a country like Afghanistan at the best of times, and Karzai knows it. Not surprisingly, he is not terribly enthusiastic about the US’ newly perceived idealism, and is more interested in political survival by playing political acrobatics at home and abroad.

At home, he is courting the Taliban. And externally, he has been making overtures to China and Iran by visiting these countries and meeting their leaders.

Optimally, Karzai would like the US to remain militarily involved in Afghanistan for an indefinite period with him as their poster boy with license to distribute political and economic patronage as he sees fit.

This was best captured in a diplomatic cable (later leaked) by US ambassador in Kabul, Karl Eikenberry, at the time when President Obama was still mulling over whether or not to send additional troops to Afghanistan.

He cautioned that, “President Karzai is not an adequate strategic partner.” Elaborating, he wrote, “The proposed [US] counter-insurgency strategy assumes an Afghan political leadership that is both able to take responsibility and to exert sovereignty in the furtherance of our goal.” And added that Karzai “and much of his circle do not want the US to leave and are only too happy to see us invest further” in an ongoing military saga.

Ambassador Eikenberry, of course, changed his views after President Obama made his decision to commit 30 000 more troops to finish the job in Afghanistan and start withdrawing US troop after 18 months.

However, Afghanistan is not a country where things can be done according to a tight time-schedule or any schedule for that matter. Karzai’s worry is that the US might not stick around in Afghanistan under the compulsions of its internal political dynamics, and Karzai might find himself vulnerable to his own country’s political eruptions.

However, in the short and medium term (over 5 years or so), both the US and Karzai need each other, as neither has viable options.

No wonder, Karzai has denied making any crazy statements attributed to him, and the Obama administration has said that President Hamid Karzai was “a figure that we respect.” The US has also denied claims by Peter Galbraith that Karzai might be a drug user.

While such political shenanigans are being enacted, Afghanistan’s fate hangs in the balance.

Note: This article was originally published in The Daily Times of April 12, 2010