The stakes are too high in Pakistan

By S.P.SETH

Reports from Pakistan suggest that its military offensive against the Taliban in South Waziristan is making progress. There is, however, no way of assessing the success or otherwise of military operations because, as of now, Pakistan is not allowing media access to the operational area.

It is not unreasonable to surmise, though, that Pakistani troops are having the upper hand. Apart from their large number at 30,000 troops against about 10,000 Taliban fighters, Pakistan military also has the great advantage of superior weapons and technology, access to American satellite intelligence and flow of US weaponry.

Therefore, in any set piece fighting against an insurgent force, a numerically large and better-equipped army is bound to do well, as should be the case with Pakistani troops.

But the Taliban have other advantages. First, the terrain favors them. It is rugged mountainous territory, enabling the Taliban to disperse and re-form in small formations. They are unlikely to be operating in static formations and will have the advantage of surprise and flexibility.

Second, they have imbued themselves as champions of Islam. There is a widespread view in Pakistan that their government and the army establishment are doing the US bidding in taking on the Taliban. The United States is not terribly popular, both with the nationalists and Islamists.

Therefore, even when the Talban are wreaking havoc on the civilian population, people seem to have divided sympathies. Most people don’t like what the Taliban are doing to their own Islamic brothers, but they are also not happy with their government’s perceived coziness with the United States.

Third, the army’s cause is not helped when its military operations lead to the internal displacement of the people in a haphazard and chaotic way. Which only adds to the dissatisfaction of the people, when they have to fend for themselves without adequate help from the state.

In this process, the state is increasingly losing whatever moral authority it had. And when it cannot even protect its own citizens against brazen terrorist attacks in their own towns, it is progressively losing legitimacy.

At a basic level, a state’s legitimacy depends on providing physical security to its citizens, and some sort of economic hope for the future. On both these counts, Pakistan’s establishment (both political and military) has failed.

Its citizens are the targets of random terrorist violence anywhere in the country. And a large number of them have no jobs and no prospects.

No wonder, a good number of them are easy recruiting material for the Taliban and other allied extremist outfits.

There is a terrible disconnect between the establishment and the people at large that simply plays into the hands of the Taliban.

Writing in a mid-year issue of the New York Review of Books, Ahmed Rashid said, “Pakistan is close to the brink…we can expect a slow, insidious, long-burning fuse of fear, terror, and paralysis that the Taliban have lit and the state is unable, and partly unwilling to douse.”

Since then the situation has only worsened, with the terrorists subjecting the country to endless violence. The terrorist bombing in Peshawar is the latest example of this dance of death in Pakistan.

Pakistan was created in the name of religion. But it has failed to forge a common identity, as was demonstrated when Bangladesh was born because of ethnic and cultural reasons.

Now the Taliban are bent on redefining Pakistan in the name of a different brand of Islam. And the way things are going they seem to be setting the agenda by creating mayhem all around. And if they succeed in bringing down the Pakistani state, the implications are horrendous.

Pakistan is a nuclear state. And with the state weakened or simply becoming non-functional, the Taliban might become the new state. And that will give them access to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.

As US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reportedly said last April, “One of our concerns…is that if the worst, the unthinkable were to happen, and this advancing Taliban… were to essentially topple the government for failure to beat them back, then they would have the keys to the nuclear arsenal of Pakistan… we can’t even contemplate that.”

Nor would the rest of the world.

The Nightmare that is Pakistan

By S.P.SETH

One thing the Obama administration has got right is that Afghanistan and Pakistan are intertwined when it comes to insurgency and terrorism in these two countries. But it still doesn’t help much when devising a coherent and effective strategy to deal with the problem.

Lately, the US has come to believe that the Taliban comprises moderates and hardliners. The first group is supposed to owe allegiance to tribal leaders and warlords, who might be swayed (with money and being left alone to exercise power in their respective fiefdoms).

The second group is supposedly much more ideological and fundamentalist, with strong links to the al-Qaeda leadership ensconced in Pakistani territory. Under the new evolving US strategy, the US will go after them by targeted missile attacks from unmanned drone aircraft and the Special Forces operations.

The problem, though, is that there is no such neat division between the moderates and hard line elements in the Taliban. Nothing in Afghanistan and Pakistan is neat and easily identified.

Indeed, the Taliban are trying to take advantage of the confusion in the United States on the ongoing debate regarding the appropriate strategy in Afghanistan. They recently posted a statement on some of their websites asserting that they are simply fighting to expel foreign invaders from Afghanistan, and to establish an Islamic state.

According to the statement, “ We didn’t have any agenda to harm other countries…nor we have such agenda today.”

It added, “If you want to turn the country [Afghanistan] into a colony, then know that we have an unwavering determination and are braced for a prolonged war.”

On surface, the statement seems innocuous enough positing them as a nationalist force trying to free their country of foreign domination and occupation. But their open assertion to establish an Islamic state is not all that innocent.

Going by the recent history of militant Islam and the ongoing crusade to right the wrongs against Muslims all around the world, an activist Islamic state will not be like any other nation state. It will not be a version of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait or any of these Islamic kingdoms that are as much worried about militant Islam as is rest of the world.

Afghanistan will be a radical Islamic state. With both Afghan and Pakistan Taliban being ideological and religious twins, Pakistan will become even more vulnerable to terrorist attacks.

In that sense, the Obama administration has got it right that the danger from Taliban straddles both sides of the border. But the problem is that Pakistan’s establishment, even though aware of the danger, is still refusing to accept that Taliban extremism, militancy and terrorism is an existential threat for the Pakistani state, as it exists.

If any proof were needed, the recent Taliban attack on Pakistan’s military headquarters in Rawalpindi would clinch the issue. The Pakisitani army commandos were able to flush out the Taliban but at not inconsiderable loss of life. More than that, the audacious Taliban attack on Pakistan’s military citadel is a proof of how close the Taliban have come to destabilize the Pakistani state.

But still its military establishment and opinion makers are more worried about the perceived loss of sovereignty from some performance bench marks required by the United States over its much-enhanced 5-year aid package than the existential threat they face from the Taliban.

The US, for instance, is seeking to require a “sustained commitment” against terrorism by way of “ceasing support” to terrorist groups and “dismantling terrorist bases.” The US also requires that the military should not interfere with the country’s civilian political process.

Which doesn’t seem draconian in any sense. Indeed, such commitment against terrorism is in Pakistan’s own interest, considering the way the terrorists can strike at will. The Pakistani establishment does not realize that they need all the help they can get to fight the Taliban.

And one important way of doing this is to improve the people’s living conditions for which they need civilian aid from the United States and other sources.

The majority of Pakistan’s people do not support Taliban or extremist religious parties, as has been demonstrated again and again during elections held now and then; though, lately, there has been some disturbing increase in electoral support for religious parties.

The fact is that people don’t see any hope from the established order to improve their economic and social situation. At the same time, as the Taliban and their associated groups penetrate deeper into Punjab, the heartland of the country, the people are increasingly fearful of them.

The result might be the creeping Talibanization of Pakistan, with the established political order hollowing out from within, and hammered from outside by terrorists.

The sad thing is that it is still not hitting Pakistan’s rulers that they might be on borrowed time, unless they re-think and re-fashion their old hackneyed theories and go all out against the Taliban and their associated terrorist and militant groups. Otherwise, the whole country will end up being a vast terrorist base against the world, with a population of 165 million people. This is what nightmares are made of.

A new US strategy for Afghanistan

By S.P.SETH

As the US casualties in Afghanistan mount, the Afghan war is becoming increasingly unpopular in the United States. The NATO military operations in Afghanistan, with the United States making the largest contribution, is in the midst of a comprehensive re-evaluation by the Obama administration.

Basically, the strategy expounded by General Stanley McChrystal, the US commander in Afghanistan, seeks to restrict military operations to populous areas by providing security to Afghan people; combining it with building up Afghanistan’s military and its institutions. This will also create an environment for Afghanistan’s economic development.

It will be a long-term project to win the people’s hearts and minds, without expending military resources in chasing the Taliban all over the remote and sparsely populated areas of the country.

For this new counter-insurgency strategy to work over a period of time, General McChrystal is seeking additional 40,000 troops over and above the 20,000 already committed by President Obama after coming to power. Which will take the US troop levels to over 100,000 troops.

General McChrystal contends, in his report to Defense Secretary Robert Gates, that without a radical restructuring of US counter-insurgency strategy as he has recommended, the war in Afghanistan “will likely result in failure.”

He has argued that: “Failure to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the near-term [in the next 12 to 18 months] while Afghan security capacity matures risks an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible.”

But, with the new strategy, despite the seriousness of the situation, “success is still achievable.”

In an uncharacteristic way for a military commander, General McChrystal has been making a high pitch publicly for his counter-insurgency strategy that has the effect of making it a political issue in the United States.

He is not only asking for more troops, he is, in fact, asking Americans to completely change their mindset when it concerns US commitment in Afghanistan. To quote him: “We must do things dramatically differently—even uncomfortably differently—to change how we operate and also how we think.”

Furthermore, “Our every action must reflect this change of mindset: how we traverse the country, how we use force and how we partner with the Afghans.”

The fact is, he goes on, “Our campaign in Afghanistan has been historically under-resourced and remains so today. Almost every aspect of our collective effort and associated resourcing has lagged a growing insurgency, historically a recipe for failure in counter-insurgency.”

In his view, “Success is not ensured by additional forces alone but continued under-resourcing will likely cause failure.”

By making his view known through media leaks (whether or not from his side) and by canvassing in public forums, he is not only putting pressure on President Obama but also appears to be promoting a political message.

Not surprisingly, the Republican leadership in the Congress is supporting his blueprint, thus putting President Obama in a difficult situation.

Vice President, Joe Biden, has an alternative option that will restrict US operations to hunting the al Qaeda in the tribal areas bordering Pakistan and Afghanistan and the surrounding region where their leaders are believed to be sheltering.

The emphasis will be more on using drone and similar remote control aircraft, with missiles aimed at al-Qaeda targets.

It is contended that this strategy is already working, with a good number of al-Qaeda leaders killed in these operations.

It is argued that the use of such remote control tactics, combined with Special Forces’ operations, should create better outcomes than spreading out American troops thinly all over Afghanistan. And this might even lead to the withdrawal of some US troops at some point.

The problem with this strategy is that it will be greatly dependent not only on Pakistan’s acquiescence but also its active cooperation, which might be problematic.

Another problem is that it treats al-Qaeda and Taliban too neatly as separate entities with their distinct interests. And it assumes that the Taliban will be responsive to being left alone to pursue their local objective of recapturing power in Afghanistan, while the US goes after the al-Qaeda leadership.

In other words it takes too much for granted in a situation that is so fragile and ever changing.

For instance, Pakistan has tried the strategy of making deals with Taliban and the frontier tribal leadership, but with disastrous results.

As things stand, it seems that President Obama might settle for a hybrid mix of raising troop levels by about 10,000 while, at the same time, pursuing the Joe Biden strategy of concentrating largely on the al-Qaeda threat.

Its rationale being that the Taliban activities is basically a local game, that doesn’t present any direct threat to US security.

It might buy President Obama some time at home, but is unlikely to resolve his dilemma in his “war of necessity” in Afghanistan.

A new US strategy for Afghanistan

By S.P.SETH

As the US casualties in Afghanistan mount, the Afghan war is becoming increasingly unpopular in the United States. The NATO military operations in Afghanistan, with the United States making the largest contribution, is in the midst of a comprehensive re-evaluation by the Obama administration.

Basically, the strategy expounded by General Stanley McChrystal, the US commander in Afghanistan, seeks to restrict military operations to populous areas by providing security to Afghan people; combining it with building up Afghanistan’s military and its institutions. This will also create an environment for Afghanistan’s economic development.

It will be a long-term project to win the people’s hearts and minds, without expending military resources in chasing the Taliban all over the remote and sparsely populated areas of the country.

For this new counter-insurgency strategy to work over a period of time, General McChrystal is seeking additional 40,000 troops over and above the 20,000 already committed by President Obama after coming to power. Which will take the US troop levels to over 100,000 troops.

General McChrystal contends, in his report to Defense Secretary Robert Gates, that without a radical restructuring of US counter-insurgency strategy as he has recommended, the war in Afghanistan “will likely result in failure.”

He has argued that: “Failure to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the near-term [in the next 12 to 18 months] while Afghan security capacity matures risks an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible.”

But, with the new strategy, despite the seriousness of the situation, “success is still achievable.”

In an uncharacteristic way for a military commander, General McChrystal has been making a high pitch publicly for his counter-insurgency strategy that has the effect of making it a political issue in the United States.

He is not only asking for more troops, he is, in fact, asking Americans to completely change their mindset when it concerns US commitment in Afghanistan. To quote him: “We must do things dramatically differently—even uncomfortably differently—to change how we operate and also how we think.”

Furthermore, “Our every action must reflect this change of mindset: how we traverse the country, how we use force and how we partner with the Afghans.”

The fact is, he goes on, “Our campaign in Afghanistan has been historically under-resourced and remains so today. Almost every aspect of our collective effort and associated resourcing has lagged a growing insurgency, historically a recipe for failure in counter-insurgency.”

In his view, “Success is not ensured by additional forces alone but continued under-resourcing will likely cause failure.”

By making his view known through media leaks (whether or not from his side) and by canvassing in public forums, he is not only putting pressure on President Obama but also appears to be promoting a political message.

Not surprisingly, the Republican leadership in the Congress is supporting his blueprint, thus putting President Obama in a difficult situation.

Vice President, Joe Biden, has an alternative option that will restrict US operations to hunting the al Qaeda in the tribal areas bordering Pakistan and Afghanistan and the surrounding region where their leaders are believed to be sheltering.

The emphasis will be more on using drone and similar remote control aircraft, with missiles aimed at al-Qaeda targets.

It is contended that this strategy is already working, with a good number of al-Qaeda leaders killed in these operations.

It is argued that the use of such remote control tactics, combined with Special Forces’ operations, should create better outcomes than spreading out American troops thinly all over Afghanistan. And this might even lead to the withdrawal of some US troops at some point.

The problem with this strategy is that it will be greatly dependent not only on Pakistan’s acquiescence but also its active cooperation, which might be problematic.

Another problem is that it treats al-Qaeda and Taliban too neatly as separate entities with their distinct interests. And it assumes that the Taliban will be responsive to being left alone to pursue their local objective of recapturing power in Afghanistan, while the US goes after the al-Qaeda leadership.

In other words it takes too much for granted in a situation that is so fragile and ever changing.

For instance, Pakistan has tried the strategy of making deals with Taliban and the frontier tribal leadership, but with disastrous results.

As things stand, it seems that President Obama might settle for a hybrid mix of raising troop levels by about 10,000 while, at the same time, pursuing the Joe Biden strategy of concentrating largely on the al-Qaeda threat.

Its rationale being that the Taliban activities is basically a local game, that doesn’t present any direct threat to US security.

It might buy President Obama some time at home, but is unlikely to resolve his dilemma in his “war of necessity” in Afghanistan.