Chaos facing Pakistan
By S.P.SETH
The news is that Pakistan army has stopped its operations against the Taliban in South Waziristan on the Pakistan-Afghan border. There has been no detailed information about the success or otherwise of the Pakistani offensive.
It is reported, though, that the army has given the control of the region to the tribal chiefs. Again, there is no real information about how the tribal chiefs will deal with the new situation and what will be the role of the Pakistan army in the new developments?
It is on par with the previous arrangements the army made to strike a deal with the tribal chiefs and the Taliban to co-opt them, with the proviso that they will break off with the al-Qaeda.
But these attempts failed disastrously in the past and are unlikely to be any more successful than before. Such interludes of supposed co-existence between the army and the Taliban only gave them valuable time to disperse and regroup, starting the conflict all over again with greater intensity.
The Pakistan military created the Taliban in the first place by throwing its weight behind them in Afghanistan’s civil war in the nineties. When the Taliban captured power in Afghanistan, Pakistan seemed to have achieved its strategic objective of “defense in depth” in any potential war with India.
Things seemed to be going well until the al-Qaeda mayhem occurred in the United States on 9/11, 2001.
With the subsequent US invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan had to (under US pressure) confront the Taliban and its militant offshoots that had sprung up with official support and encouragement. These militant offshoots, like Lashkare-e-Toiba and others, were let loose in Indian Kashmir to overstretch and pin down Indian military in that region.
Afte 9/11, however, all Pakistan’s carefully crafted and structured maneuvers, centered on the Taliban in Afghanistan and its militant offshoots in Pakistan, started to become a liability. The monster(s), which Pakistan army had created, started to turn on the country’s establishment, surprisingly even defeating the army at times in large-scale operations.
The Pakistani Taliban and its offshoots enjoyed considerable sympathy and support of the wide sections of Pakistan’s population, because of the government’s perceived role as doing the US bidding.
However, in the midst of all this, the military has kept its lines of communications open with top echelon of the Taliban leadership of Afghanistan, who are sheltering in Pakistan across the border from Afghanistan.
The visiting US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, was right when she said that it was difficult to believe that these Taliban and al-Qaeda leadership were hiding in Pakistan without anyone knowing their whereabouts.
It is these conflicting signals, among other things, that have militated against an effective Pakistani strategy to flush out militancy in the country.
These militant elements are considered strategic assets against India in Kashmir, once the Americans have withdrawn from Afghanistan—whenever that might be. A new friendly government in Afghanistan, supposedly under a new Taliban umbrella, will give Pakistan strategic depth against India.
However, in the meantime, Pakistan is increasingly becoming a basket case with no effective government, with its economy going down the hill at a faster rate.
At this rate, Pakistan might end up with no government worth the name to worry about the country’s strategic assets or losses, having done the hatchet job of ruining the country by creating a space for all kinds of militancy of one description or the other.
And this will be the worst kind of terrorist threat for the world at large.
