Tackling Terrorism

Pakistan might gain from Indonesia

By S.P.SETH

Despite claims by Pakistan’s President Zardari that his country has, more or less, defeated the Taliban, Pakistan remains most vulnerable to terrorism. Which suggests that there is a terrible disconnect between realities on the ground and wishful thinking on the part of Pakistan’s ruling establishment. And this is the crux of the problem.

In this connection, Pakistan might gain some insights from Indonesia’s experience in dealing with terrorism. Which was highlighted recently in the killing of its top terrorist, Noordin Top.

My analysis below about Indonesia in this respect might prove useful.

Indonesia’s police chief, Bambang Hendarso Danuri, was quite right to express his rejoicings over the killing of Noordin Mohammed Top when he reportedly said, “ This is a month full of blessings.” Indeed, it seemed like divine intervention to put an end to the orgy of death and destruction perpetrated by Noordin and his cohorts.

By eluding the police for so long, he had not only created a legend about his invincibility but for some a belief that he was on a divine mission to save Islam. His death has put paid to that myth, though he will be celebrated by militants and jihadists as a martyr of sorts.

The debunking of this mythology is important to reduce the allure for new adherents of somehow becoming part of a higher cause. What it means is until someone else is able to develop that kind of halo and mythology, the terrorist network in Indonesia is truly disrupted and greatly damaged.

In Indonesia where there is a very small pool of believers in the cause (that Islam is in danger), this loss is not going to be easily rectified, if at all.

It is generally acknowledged that Indonesia, under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, has done a tremendous job of going after the terrorist network. His re-election as President somehow was dimmed a bit when two Jakarta hotels were bombed about the time when Indonesia experienced the best demonstration of its democratic functioning in free and fair elections.

Noordin’s death, in a highly successful counter-terrorist operation is, therefore timely to almost coincide with SBY’s second term. But, rightly, SBY is not calling it an outright victory, although conceding that the terrorist threat has been “seriously reduced” with Noordin’s death.

As Susilo said, “…we have won a battle” but not yet the war against terrorism. In other words, Indonesia cannot become complacent. It has to continue to hunt the militant networks through better intelligence and follow up police operations.

And for any of this to work effectively, the authorities need to rely on the support and cooperation of the people. In this respect Indonesia is fortunate, as compared to some other Muslim countries, because it doesn’t have a culture of religious extremism—apart from elements on the periphery of the society.

A big problem, though, is that even a relatively small number of ideologically indoctrinated militants can create mayhem by positing that their religion is in extreme danger. And the simplicity of that message can resonate with some people, especially when the message is couched in interpretations from the Holy Book and propagated in some of the pesantrens (boarding schools).

And this can only be countered through widely disseminated education and information from public channels and educational institutions. Besides, there is need to tackle the “ignorance and poverty “ that underpins terrorism.

Jakarta is sometimes criticized for not earnestly fighting the extremist ideology by letting people like Abu Bakar Bashir, Jemaah Islamiah and other similar outfits continue to promote their hateful ideology of Islamic extremism. Undoubtedly, the government can do more to combat this.

The problem, though, is that those making such criticism are short on suggesting specific measures to deal with it. Any measures to outrightly ban such ideological extremism can sometimes be counter-productive by driving its proponents and others underground. And that can make tracking them that much harder. Besides, it tends to create a halo of sorts around them.

Another criticism centers on releasing imprisoned militants into the society after they have served their sentences. Undoubtedly, some of them might drift again into their familiar outfits and roles. But any policy that suggests locking them up forever even when they have shown signs of rehabilitation, will be lacking in necessary flexibility to deal with extremism.

Noordin Top’s death in counter-terrorism operations is certainly a significant development and achievement. However, though Noordin was a major figure in the terrorist pantheon in Indonesia and South East Asia in general, he was no Osama bin Laden as the ideological fountainhead of global terrorism. We should, therefore, keep that in perspective while evaluating his terrorist role.

By the same token, we should thank the Lord that Noordin wasn’t another Osama bin Laden.

Time is not on US side in Afghanistan

By S.P.SETH

The United States is in the midst of reappraising its military strategy to combat the Taliban threat in Afghanistan. Based on General Stanley McChrystal’s report, who heads the 100,000-strong NATO force (more than two-thirds Americans) in Afghanistan, the emphasis will be more on securing the population than engaging and chasing Taliban insurgents across the country’s wild and far-flung terrain.

There is a growing realization that the United States is not winning the war, but the situation is not yet hopeless and can be turned around. The report says, “The situation in Afghanistan is serious but success is achievable and demands a revised implementation strategy, commitment and resolve, and increased unity of effort.”

Two cardinal features of the proposed new strategy are: (i) to put more focus on securing population centers, as well as reducing civilian casualties from wild air strikes on suspected Taliban. In other words, NATO forces must become people friendly and development-oriented.

The recent air strikes hitting two NATO oil tankers, hijacked by the Taliban, have killed many civilians creating even greater anger against foreign forces in Afghanistan. Which is not a good sign for the unfolding policy.

At the operational level, it is felt that there should be greater flexibility in tasks assigned to different national components of the NATO forces. At present, only American and British troops seem to be doing much of the heavy fighting and suffering high casualties in the process.

Another feature of the new strategy is to expand the role of the Afghan troops through increased numbers and better training. The idea being that they will incrementally take over from the American forces.

But, in the interim period, the United States will pour in more troops in Afghanistan, estimated at about another 20,000. With this, the US contribution will rise to nearly 90, 000 troops, with the total NATO strength rising to 120,000 or more.

Which takes the number closer to the Soviet troop strength at the height of their occupation and eventual retreat. It is certainly an uncomfortable juxtaposition.

America’s Afghan operations increasingly look like another Vietnam in the making or the Soviet disaster. And it is tending to become Obama’s war.

Even the most comfortable assessment of the Afghan war by General McChrystal regards the situation as “serious” but capable of being turned around.

That is where the problem arises. Because all the assumptions of the new strategy are based on the idea that there is a functioning government in Afghanistan with institutional mechanisms in place to create and train an Afghan army under a chain of command and answering to an established civilian government.

This is more a cherished idea than a reality.

Afghanistan doesn’t have a legitimate functioning government. The chaos of the elections simply reinforces this reality.

And without a functioning government, any Afghan army will be a ragtag arrangement, which will disintegrate with the first whiff of American disengagement.

Time is not on America’s side. They are talking of turning the war around within a year or two. The counter-insurgency experts, on the other hand, put the time frame of at least a decade.

The war is becoming increasingly unpopular in the United States. Some estimates put the daily cost for the United States at $100 million a day. Even at the best of times, such outlays, combined with increasing casualties and with no exit strategy in sight, is not sustainable.

And these are not the best of times. The United States is in the midst of a worst recession since the thirties’ depression and its public debt is rising exponentially.

As things stand, the only sensible choice is to deal with terrorism not by occupying other countries and getting bogged down, but by a combination of deploying rapid reaction forces to deal with external threats and internal vigilance.

A new strategy to fight Taliban in Pakistan

By S.P.SETH

The Taliban in Pakistan have regrouped after their leader, Baitullah Mehsud, was killed in an American missile attack. In the Swat valley, where they suffered serious setbacks in Pakistani military operations, they have since staged a number of suicide attacks killing many innocent people.

And they have also blown up a number of NATO supply trucks meant for the troops across the border in Afghanistan.

In other words, they are back in business, if they were ever out of it. The wishful thinking that Pakistan military can eradicate the Taliban is at the core of the problem.

In Swat, the military apparently had popular support. But the displacement of people from their homes did much to erode popular support. Now many of these displaced people have been pushed back to their homes. However, they lack economic opportunities compounded by lack of security. The Taliban still seem able to run havoc at a time and place of their choosing.

Which brings us to the fundamental question: is there a military solution to the Taliban insurgency? Obviously, the answer, based on experience so far of the Pakistani military operations, has to be in the negative.

Which doesn’t mean that a military response to the Taliban threat is entirely redundant. What it means is that the military response needs to be reworked and retooled. And it needs to be integrated with reworking the country’s civilian system.

Regarding the first: considering that the greatest danger to the state comes from the Taliban, the country’s military establishment, its force structure, military doctrine and national ethos need a complete overhaul to reflect the existential threat from the Taliban insurgency.

What it means is that Pakistan’s obsession with a security threat from India is in need of a fundamental reassessment. If that were done, all sorts of possibilities will open up.

First: it will de-emphasize the religious factor in Pakistani polity and identity. Pakistan sees its identity as a Muslim state in opposition to Hindu India, even though India is a secular state with around 160 million Muslims— almost as many as in Pakistan.

Because Pakistan was created out of India as a Muslim state, the religious politics of undivided India was externalized with the country’s partition in 1947. And that remains a constant in Pakistan’s politics, with that country’s never-ending quest for security against an Indian threat.

If Pakistan were to get out of this mind-set, it will become easier to rework the country’s military profile, with more emphasis on fighting the Taliban insurgency.

Second: with the reorientation of the military profile to fight insurgency, there will be considerable scope to reduce military expenditure designed to fight a conventional war with India.

Third: any credible movement in Pakistan to revise its military profile, now focused on an Indian threat, will open up vast opportunities of fruitful cooperation between the two countries in all directions—trade, cultural, political, military exchanges and so on. This will have a flow on effect on all aspects of national life.

However, any reorientation of Pakistan’s military strategy will not work by itself unless it is combined with a simultaneous effort to rebuild society.

Pakistan is plagued with mass illiteracy as there is not much left in the national coffers for education or other nation-building activities, with military hogging the lion’s share of the national resources.

The religious schools (madrasas) have cropped up everywhere with their free tuition and boarding, and a strict diet of Islamic education.

No wonder, Pakistan has so many young students from these madrasas lining up to become Taliban activists and martyrs. With such over-supply, they are even able to supplement the Afghan Taliban on their murderous course.

In a country where people, by and large, have no hope, the call for Jihad appears to have a transcendental message of rising above all “petty” worldly considerations and aim straight for martyrdom and paradise.

Therefore, to create an alternative message of hope, Pakistan’s establishment not only needs to revise its military profile to focus on the Taliban insurgency, but also to combine it with rebuilding the country’s social infrastructure.

And in this, Pakistan will be able to get considerable support and aid from the international community.