Will the Pakistani state prevail?
By S.P.SETH
Things are happening thick and fast in Pakistan, though not for the good of its people. The recent bombing in Lahore at a religious shine was heart-rending. The Sufi steam is the most heartening feature of Islam with a consensual sub-continental culture. To see this being attacked with such ferocity leaves one with a sense of utter helplessness. And coming as it does after senseless attacks on the Ahmediya community, it is felt as a terrible tragedy.
The question then is: what is the agenda of these extremist elements? These are obviously disparate elements united in their common hatred of all those branded as the enemy of Islam. And these include domestic as well as foreign “enemies”. These “enemies” are seen everywhere by the militants.
Inside the country, they constitute the majority of the people who have, by and large, stayed away from political parties aligned to religious extremism. The electoral history of Pakistan would show that these parties have always been in minority when it comes to voting, though they lately gained some traction because of the volatility of the situation within Pakistan.
If that is the case, why haven’t they been isolated and dealt with accordingly? This has to do with the country’s political and economic development since its creation. Although Pakistan has made some economic progress, it hasn’t filtered down in any appreciable way, if at all, to the mass of the people who need it the most. The feudal class still wields political power, with an added layer of industrial barons.
Indeed, a symbiotic nexus developed between them, with the new industrial class at times wielding the baton both as feudal lords, and industrial barons. And on top are the military brass at times sharing power and, most often, sidelining the civilian political elite.
What it means is that the clerical establishment of the country has often felt left out of the political equation. That wasn’t a bad thing since their electoral weight was minimal. But as self-appointed guardians of the country’s Islamic character, the clerical establishment believes that Pakistan has lost its way. The Islamist parties have hammered this message all through.
As Pakistan made its way into the eighties, two things happened. First: having got rid of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in the late-seventies, General Zia-ul-Haq made his political base among the country’s religious orthodoxy. He promulgated ordinances to legitimize some outdated laws, and won favor with the clerical establishment and many ordinary people who believe in the sanctity of old Islamic injunctions. It changed the character of Pakistan’s polity. It also started to introduce a certain religious fervor in the lower and middle ranks of the military.
These internal developments coincided with Pakistan’s induction as a US ally to beef up the Afghan Mujahidin’s armed struggle to expel the Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Pakistan became the conduit for funneling US arms into Afghanistan. Apart from being a national struggle, the Afghan Mujahidin’s military campaign was also a crusade of sorts against the godless Soviet Union. And the Americans found its religious overtones quite useful as a motivating factor in its Cold War with the Soviet Union.
Zia-ul-Haq’s attempts to make Pakistan into a crypto religious state mingled with the US anti-Soviet strategy in Afghanistan. With the US as Pakistan’s major ally and the source of its large military and economic aid, such intermingling of their interests gave Zia great latitude within the country. In other words, Zia’s internal and external policy was greatly influenced by the dictates of US prescriptions for Afghanistan.
The Mujahidin’s armed struggle against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan seemed too successful, with the Soviet Union forced to withdraw. It emphasized that it was possible to defeat a powerful enemy by the deployment of irregular and highly motivated (especially with religious overtones) forces. Which would have consequences later in terms of the terrorist threat.
For Pakistan the results of the Afghan war, and the subsequent civil war in the country, were mixed. On the positive side, the Pakistani establishment was happy to have a friendly Taliban government in power. This was supposed to give Pakistan defense in depth against a military threat from India.
Pakistani intelligence had also established close contacts with the Taliban at different levels, as well as (presumably) with foreign (mostly Arab) elements that had thronged to fight with the Afghan Mujahidin against the Soviet Union. Another important segment of these volunteers were some Pakistani nationals fighting on the Afghan side. With the Soviets out of the picture and the Cold War coming to an end, all these elements suddenly found themselves out of their moral crusade.
Not long after, the Arab volunteers (with Osama bin Laden at the helm) found refuge with the new Taliban government in Afghanistan. And they started planning a global crusade against the United States, encouraged by their successes against the Soviet Union. Which led to the spectacular attack on the World Trade Centre in New York by ramming aircraft into the multi-storey building and killing about 3000 people. It was a dramatic announcement of a global terror campaign against the United States and its allies, with the avowed purpose of eventually creating an Islamic Caliphate.
Instead of providing strategic depth in Afghanistan under a friendly Taliban government, Pakistan ended up being a frontline state of the US war against the Afghan Taliban. Where it still is.
However, the most insidious result of all this for Pakistan has been the outgrowth of its own Taliban movement which seeks to subvert the Pakistani state and replace it with a Pakistani-version of the Taliban government in Afghanistan. Apparently, there are close links between the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani Taliban, as a good number of them have been the product of the madrassas in Pakistan.
By encouraging extremist religious elements as a strategic tool in Afghanistan, and against India, Pakistan spawned the Taliban (both in Afghanistan and within Pakistan) and other extremist elements. When the Pakistani state sought to dissociate itself from these elements and then turned against them under US pressure, the intricate linkages between them and some state and military instrumentalities were already too deeply embedded to make a clean break. There is a sense that these elements might still be useful after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan.
The point though is that these forces (now extending their sway into Punjab and its capital, Lahore) have acquired their own momentum. Through terror they seem determined to make the state do their bidding than the other way around. In this tug of war, Pakistani people are increasingly becoming a hostage of both sides.
Will the state prevail? The problem is that the Pakistani establishment is not only fractious, but is given to adhocism. And though many people would like some semblance of security and economic opportunities, they are not enamored of their rulers. Indeed, many people regard them as self-serving and corrupt, engaged in their own power games. There is, therefore, widely prevailing apathy. Against this backdrop, the Taliban alternative, invoking a state based on Islamic precepts and doctrines, might not seem all that bad to the common man with deep faith in his religion.
Pakistan thus finds itself in a state of flux. And the state, such as it is, lacks the will power and the unity of purpose to go after the militants.
