Afghanistan is not easy to crack

By S.P.SETH

There are two distinctive features of the recent military offensive by the US and its allies in Afghanistan. First, it was announced with great fanfare quite some time before the military operations actually started in the Helmand province. Second, after its commencement, a virtual victory was announced with equal fervor.

It would now seem that the prize of Marjah, considered an important center of the Taliban power is under US control. Now there is talk of installing a local regime there, assured of all the funding for development projects with the prospect of creating employment opportunities.

From the enthusiastic conversation going on in the US camp, Marjah is going to become the show case of what will be possible with the ejection of the Taliban insurgents—a secure Afghanistan under a democratic Afghan political order with immense opportunities for its people for employment and to develop their potential.

In their enthusiasm for Marjah as a blueprint (yet to materialize) for a new Afghanistan, the question of a corrupt and incompetent Hamiz Karzai regime, as the kingpin of the old/ new political order, is conveniently overlooked.

Will the Karzai regime have a miraculous transformation to become the agent of positive change in the country? Even if that were possible (an unlikely development on the basis of the experience so far), where is the institutional, infrastructural and popular backup for this to happen?

Afghanistan is a tribal structure divided by ethnicity, with multiple dialects and language groups. And to superimpose a European political model on such foundations is bound to be creaky, unsound and likely to fail.

At the same time, to imagine that Afghanistan’s newly minted armed forces (with no background and experience of a disciplined armed force) will answer to a civilian government (racked by tribal and ethnic factions and corrupt to the boot) is beyond comprehension.

One wishes this would be possible, but it is as well to deal with realities.

However, the scenario of a model Marjah, and eventually a successful Afghanistan, is predicated on the elimination of the Taliban, not only in Afghanistan but also in Pakistan that is the sanctuary of its leadership. But this is not achieved by simply prevailing in Marjah, a small enclaave in Helmand province.

Indeed, as was expected, the Taliban has simply dispersed to regroup to fight another day and at another place.

One explanation for the new military offensive, and the emphasis on its successful culmination, is: to impress on the moderates and the rank and files that the Taliban’s days are over, and that they might as well opt for political reconciliation with the existing order to participate in the political process. Bu so far this is not happening in any significant way, if at all.

It was clear that the Taliban wouldn’t fight an overwhelmingly powerful US army, being no match for them in open warfare. Their strategy has been to slow down the enemy by planting the terrain with improvised explosive devices (IED), distract them with sniper fire, to retreat in the face of overwhelming enemy force and weaponry, and to disperse and operate in small mobile guerilla formations.

Unlike regular armies, like the United States, they don’t have a rigid and stratified chain of command. And they have the advantage of flexibility and surprise.

Much was made that the US now had a new strategy of securing the population centers. But there have been a number of civilian deaths from NATO bombing ever since the operations began in Helmand province not so long ago, inviting condemnation by the Afghan government and others.

At the same there is now talk of expanding NATO military offensive into Kandahar province with a population of more than a million people; being the nerve centre of the Taliban. This will be a much bigger operation involving greater civilian deaths, and greater resistance from the Taliban.

Of course, they will have no chance of defeating the NATO troops, though they will try to draw out the enemy forces into their favored terrain to inflict maximum casualties.

One important advantage the Taliban has is that they are not fighting to a time schedule like the Americans are, and they are fighting in their own homeland. The American military is supposed to turn around the outcome of the war between 12 to 18 months, though there is some, but not much, flexibility about the time frame.

But considering that the next US presidential election is in 2012, any prolonged military operations will have political consequences back home.

But the Taliban doesn’t have such time constraints. They simply have to wait out the Americans who won’t be able to remain significantly involved in Afghanistan for a prolonged period.

Therefore, the idea that by inflicting set-piece military defeat on the Taliban they might be coerced into political reconciliation with the Karzai regime and enter the political system, is far-fetched. They have turned down many overtures to this effect in the past from President Karzai and others.

They want the withdrawal of foreign military forces from Afghanistan before considering any internal political reconciliation.

The fact of the matter is that once there is a major drawdown of American forces from Afghanistan, the Karzai government’s days will be numbered, being seen as a tool of the US occupation.

Therefore, the advice of the US ambassador, Karl Eikenberry, to President Obama (before he made the decision to send another 30, 000 US troops into Afghanistan) is still relevant.

He advised (in a cable since leaked): “The proposed [US] counter-insurgency strategy assumes an Afghan political leadership that is able to both take responsibility and to exert sovereignty in the furtherance of our goal.”

But, he added, that the Karzai government and the people around him, “do not want the US to leave and are only too happy to see us invest further” in the Afghan operation.

In other words, they won’t mind the US forces bogged down in Afghanistan on behalf of the Karzai government.