Imran Khan as Pakistan’s savior?

S P SETH

At times it would appear that Pakistan is being torn apart by internal warfare. Its most disturbing manifestation is a string of attacks on military installations for which the Tehreek-i-Taliban has often claimed responsibility to avenge the killings of Osama bin Laden and its other icons. The most recent target was the Kamra airbase off Islamabad. The ease with which such attacks have been mounted on some of the most secure military installations would suggest some internal help from extremist elements within the force. Indeed, there were reports of this when Mehran naval base in Karachi was attacked in May last year. 

If the Taliban have infiltrated the armed forces, directly or indirectly, the country is in a lot of trouble. In that case, the extremists would have succeeded in capturing the state from within. Pakistan’s other institutions like the government of the day and judiciary will hardly be able to stem the slide into a Taliban-dominated state. The only other example of this is Afghanistan under the Taliban rule, hardly a shining example. It might be worse in Pakistan, which is a large country of an estimated 180 million people. And if a Taliban-run state in Pakistan were to use or allow the country to be used for al Qaeda kind of activities, as the Taliban did in Afghanistan, the world would be a very scary place with tremendous destructive potential for Pakistan and its people.

Another highly disturbing development is the regularity with which the Shias are being targeted and killed in different parts of the country, with the state apparently unable or unwilling to do much about it for all sorts of reasons. How much of a nexus there is between extremist Sunni groups and the Taliban behind these killings isn’t all that clear but it is all part of the culture of violence that is permeating the country. This kind of pattern of killings tends to reinforce the view that the state is almost ceasing to exist in a climate of mindless violence.

It is against this backdrop that Imran Khan (and his Tehreek-e-Insaf) has staked his claim as the country’s possible savior. Judging from the attendance at his rallies around the country, he appears to be Pakistan’s most popular political leader. There have to be some plausible reasons for such. One reason, of course, is that the country is in such a parlous state that people are desperately looking for a savior. With their self-serving politicking, Pakistan’s corrupt political leaders are compounding the situation. No wonder the Taliban and other extremist elements are growing stronger. And here comes Imran Khan with his simple message. Which is that he will be able to reconcile all competing, contending and conflicting forces in the country by simply opening a dialogue with them, particularly with the Taliban. Though Khan says that he doesn’t approve of the Taliban violence, he is however understanding of it as a reactive response to the army’s anti-terror strategy which targets them.

And why is the Taliban being targeted? Here he taps into the widespread anti-American rage in Pakistan across the spectrum that has become even more entrenched after the killing of Osama bin Laden in a US raid. As Khan told Steve Coll of the New Yorker, “ The so-called ‘liberals’ [in Pakistan] treat the Taliban as if there were only one way to deal with them--- through the military.” He added, “They are cut off from the rest of Pakistan. They look at Pakistan through Western lenses. They actually don’t know what Pakistan is.” This is an extraordinary statement to make that tends to absolve the Taliban of any responsibility for the virtual orgy of terrorist violence enveloping the country. And he promises to end terrorism in Pakistan through negotiations with the Taliban within 90 days.

By keeping his message simple and hopeful, Imran Khan is either being terribly naïve or politically smart to bank on his people’s desperation to vote him into power as a messiah waving a magic wand. We know that there is no such thing as a magic wand, even with Khan as the magician. His naivety is on display when asked how he will deal with the Pakistani military that is used to running the country directly or indirectly? He answered that he would discipline them the way he did his cricket team as their captain. They simply will have to fall in line like every other institution in the country, if he were to become the prime minister. In his own words, “…You have to tell them, ‘Look, this is the way it it’s going to run now’.”

One wonders why nobody else in Pakistan thought of such a simple and straightforward solution. While Khan talks of running the army like his cricket team, there is considerable speculation in Pakistan that Khan himself, as a politician, is a creation of the ISI. In other words, it remains an open question if Khan will do the military’s bidding or the other way around?

And in the larger scheme of the country’s economic development, it is even a bigger challenge of raising enough, indeed huge, resources. But Imran Khan doesn’t see it that way. His solution is again very simple. He will simply ensure that the rich will pay their taxes. Even if it were feasible to make rich and everyone else into an honest citizen (though it hasn’t happened anywhere else in the world), Pakistan will still need massive resources to make a credible start in lifting the country’s economy. This will require considerable foreign aid and investment that is unlikely to materialize on the scale required without relative peace and stability in Pakistan. But Khan is already set against any US aid regarding it as a “curse”, causing dependency. He might, therefore, be thinking of tapping into aid and investments from Saudi Arabia and other rich Middle Eastern countries, as well as China, but that still will be exchanging one dependency for another.

The point is that Imran Khan has no blueprint on any of the issues facing his country. What he has is a list of simple and pious wishes that will somehow be translated into action as he did with his cricket team, or in his charity work. But a country as complex as Pakistan with its continuing terrorist violence and an overlay of sectarian and ethnic conflicts, cannot be equated with a cricket team or a charity event.  May be Khan will surprise everyone, if he becomes Pakistan’s prime minister in the next election, beyond the reach of human experience!    

Note: This article was first published in the Daily Times.

Pakistan and its multiple troubles

S P SETH

Pakistan is wracked by multiple troubles—the latest being the on going confrontation between its highest judiciary and the government. Pakistan’s Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani was  consigned to the reformatory, so to say, on a charge of contempt of court for not complying with the Supreme Court’s direction to urge the Swiss authorities to reactivate the old corruption case against President Asaf Ali Zardari for stashing away $60 million in Swiss banks when he was a minister in his wife, Benazir Bhutto’s cabinet. The court wouldn’t accept the argument that his boss, Zardari, was immune from it as President of the country.

The matter is further complicated because, with Gilani’s conviction on contempt recorded on April 24, all his decisions and that of his government (including the national budget) between this date and his departure might become null and void; though President Zardari has reportedly absolved him of any responsibility. But this too could become another issue between the Supreme Court and the President. But, as of now, the Supreme Court has directed the new Prime Minister Raja Pervez Ashraf to follow up the Court’s direction regarding pursuing the corruption case against Zardari. He might go the way of his immediate predecessor, Gilani, if ignoring the court’s order. In other words, if this game of musical chairs continues, Pakistan might end up with a non-functioning government necessitating new elections before due date sometime next year next year. To make matters even more complex, Lahore High Court has reactivated its direction to President Zardari to quit his party political post of co-chairman of the ruling PPP or else face contempt proceedings.

But coming back to the Supreme Court, one might ask: is Court following the rule of law in pursuing this matter or there is something else going on? One can never be sure in these matters because humans, even the purest among us, are not robots working on set programs. It is quite possible to rationalize one’s prejudices and vendetta into higher principles of public good. The judges, of course, tend to follow the law. This is where the problem lies because an argument is made that the law and its international practice preclude the president of a country, Zardari in this case, from prosecution during his time in office.

The Supreme Court has overruled this defense by virtue of being the highest judicial authority in the land and hence the ultimate arbiter—whether one likes it or not. Hence Gilani and his government had to lump the court’s decision, and this might happen again with the new Prime Minister.

A follow up question is: wouldn’t the same objective be achieved by waiting for the elections next year when, it looks like, this government will be defeated in a popular referendum of sorts thus creating a convergence between the court’s objective and the people’s will. And with Zardari no longer the president, he will have no legal immunity. The advantage of this approach is that Pakistan will escape a political and judicial upheaval, and the Court will avoid becoming a controversial entity.

At a time when Pakistan is once again trying to restart its democratic process, the reputation of its highest court and its integrity are a fundamental part of it. And the court and its Chief Justice, Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, played an important and courageous role in helping to restore democratic civilian rule after an eight-year long dictatorship of General Musharraf. Chaudhry became a folk hero in Pakistan, particularly to its urban middle class. He still enjoys considerable support in Pakistan for his crusade to rid the country of corruption that envelops its political class of all descriptions.

But, for the first time, judicial activism that looks like supplanting the executive and legislative branches of the country’s governance is creating criticism. So much so that even Chief Justice’s own son has been ensnared into it with allegations of large amount of bribes from a wealthy real estate tycoon, which probably is part of the political horse-trading Pakistan is going through. The point, though, is that Pakistan’s highest judiciary appears politicized. This is rather unfortunate and hence the need for treading judiciously so soon after the democratic process was restored. In the circumstances, it might make sense to let the political process take its own course at the soon-to-be held elections.

Pakistan already has too many problems weighing down the country. Its economy is a mess. The inflation is taking its toll, stoking popular unrest. There are serious energy shortages expressed in the Orwellian expression of load shedding. Terrorism is, of course, a major issue, compounded with ethnic and sectarian violence. The state violence in Baluchistan appears to have no end in sight. It is difficult for an outside observer to comprehend the political-judicial shenanigans overtaking Pakistan’s establishment when there are so many other, perhaps, more pressing problems confronting the country.

At such a time, its political class is engaged in the task of tearing each other apart. The opposition PML-N and PTI are gunning for Zardari and have found in the judiciary a useful ally because of its reputation for probity and integrity. At the same time the Zardari Government’s record in office is abysmal, both in terms of governance and corruption, that it doesn’t appear to have many friends among the people. The problem, though, is that Pakistan’s entire political class is so discredited and reeking of corruption that, with the exception of a few individuals that this correspondent has no knowledge of, none among them can claim to be lilywhite pure. The PTI, led by Imran Khan, is still untested having not been exposed to the lures of political and economic power so far.

In other words, Pakistan’s polity is a disaster zone. Tomorrow’s rulers might find themselves in the same situation as the present government is if the political class doesn’t heed the message that they are there to serve the people and not to rob them. If not, and in the absence of any viable alternative—with military rule having been tried for half of Pakistan’s existence and found to be as bad or worse than its self-seeking politicians—people might be tempted to join the extremist/terrorist outfits causing more havoc. In that situation, the judiciary too will become irrelevant.

Therefore, instead of trying to prove a point that everyone, including prime minister and, for that matter, president is equal before the law as interpreted and upheld by the country’s highest court, it might make sense to let the people make their judgment known in the elections next year and to allow an elected civilian government to complete its full term. The normal democratic process of periodic elections, with people deciding the politicians’ fate, might make them more responsive to their wishes. This cycle of abruptly disrupted/destroyed democratic political process, through military coups or whatever, is keeping Pakistan in a constant state of uncertainty and near-anarchy damaging its evolution into a normal functioning state. It is not to suggest this will solve Pakistan’s problems. But it might, over time, create a workable system.

Note: This article was first published in the Daily Times

Pakistan’s Afghan dilemma

S P SETH

Pakistan’s relations with the US and its allies seem to be on the mend with reports that the suspended NATO supply route to Afghanistan might be reopened. The route was closed by Pakistan after 24 of its soldiers were killed last November by the US forces on the Pakistan-Afghan border. Whether it will mean any real improvement in their relationship remains problematic because both remain hostage to the developments in Afghanistan. While the Hamid Karzai government might feel reassured about the US commitment to a post-2014 Afghanistan after the US military withdrawal, following the strategic partnership between the two countries for ten years; Pakistan might not be all that happy.  With the US involvement, of sorts, likely to continue, Pakistan’s capacity to shape developments to its strategic advantage will be severely constrained. Therefore, Afghanistan will remain a difficult issue affecting US-Pakistan relations for quite some time even after 2014.

It would appear that there is considerable confusion in the higher echelons of the Pakistan military about how best to achieve their strategic objectives in Afghanistan. There is, of course, the clearly understood goal of creating strategic depth in Afghanistan under Pakistani influence. But to imagine that an independent Afghan regime, presumably run by the Taliban, will follow Pakistan’s strategic dictates is a wild assumption. According to some reports, even at this point of time when the Taliban leadership is said to be sheltering in Pakistan, the relationship between some of Pakistan’s top generals and the Taliban leaders in residence is quite testy, bordering on deep distrust. It, therefore, doesn’t bode well for Pakistan’s presumed confidence that the Taliban leadership, if and when in power again, will play Pakistan’s cards.

In a recent review article in the New York Review of Books on a bunch of books on Afghanistan, Anatol Lieven has written that, “… sensible Pakistani [military officers] do not want the Taliban to conquer the whole of Afghanistan, because they would then be free to turn on Pakistan by giving their support to their Pashtun brothers who are in revolt against Pakistan as part of the Pakistani Taliban…”

Since Professor Lieven is considered an expert on Pakistan, and Afghanistan (his latest book, Pakistan: A Hard Country) it is worth quoting him at some length. He writes: “Just what the Pakistani security establishment is really aiming at [in Afghanistan] is extremely difficult to work out. Quite apart from the levels of opacity and deceit in which Pakistani policy is wrapped, the Pakistani state is weak and soft. Even in the military, the lines of command have become blurred.”

Highlighting the role of the ISI in Afghan affairs, he comments that, “Indeed, so close is the identification of some ISI officers with the Taliban that there is some doubt whether the Taliban is acting as Pakistan’s proxy or the ISI is acting as the Taliban’s proxy.”

Such confusion of policy and implementation, when the state is soft and weak, portends danger for Pakistan. And the danger clearly is that Pakistan is becoming hostage to a set of assumptions that do not hang together. They need a policy where the Taliban ceases to be its centerpiece, because it is actually weakening the foundations of the Pakistani state. The meteoric rise of the Pakistani Taliban (an offshoot of the Afghan Taliban), and the deadly violence it is inflicting on the Pakistani society (with their fraternal linkages with other extremist and terrorist groups), is an existential threat for Pakistan.

Unless and until this realization dawns on the Pakistani state, particularly its military, Pakistan is likely to lurch from one tragedy to another. In this context whether its relations with the US are on the mend or not is immaterial. Pakistan’s own contradictions and conflicts are so overwhelming that the State has no time to work out an alternative strategy to save Pakistan. Let us face it, Pakistan is in danger of imploding from inside.

In the midst of all this, some of the Afghans living in Australia were mulling over their country’s fate after the US withdrawal in 2014 at a national TV forum here. Most of them were against the US withdrawal in 2014 for fear that it would put in jeopardy the limited gains in education facilities for girls in the cities, and other benefits of relative openness of Afghan society, at least in the cities.

There was also concern about Pakistan’s role as a safe haven for terrorists and extremists to destabilize Afghanistan. And it was feared that the return of the Taliban, if it were to eventuate, would be disastrous for the minorities, like the Hazaras.

The Afghan diaspora generally shares these fears, many of whom fled Afghanistan to escape the country’s mayhem, and they fear the worst in terms of a possible civil war in the country and/or the return of the Taliban into power in parts of the country. The Taliban are unlikely to be the sole political actor in the country, because they will be resisted by the warlords in the north and by other ethnic groups like the Tajik. The Afghan diaspora,  therefore, by and large, favor US troop presence beyond 2014, believing that this would somehow be tantamount to stability of sorts. In some way, though, foreign troops in Afghanistan are part of the problem, and not its solution.

However, there is one issue that is somehow skirted in all this talk of the US military withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014. Which is: what sort of political order is envisaged in the post-2014 period when the withdrawal of foreign troops would coincide with the end of Karzai’s constitutional term as Afghanistan’s president.

Karzai probably would like to continue. But that would be unconstitutional. This might be fixed, though, with a managed constitutional amendment, followed by a managed/manipulated election. If that happens, it would further delegitimize the system and the regime. And how would the US and its NATO allies respond to it? As it is, Karzai might appear to be the only dependable ally for the US, notwithstanding his quirkiness and tendency to play all the cards at the same time.

In other words, apart from the Taliban danger, there are other imponderables in the Afghan situation as well. Therefore, the post-2014 situation, following NATO withdrawal, could turn out to be even more messy and lethal than what has happened so far.

And Pakistan will be in the middle of it all. It is imperative that it should work out a strategic vision and not go for tactical gains that have a habit of turning into greater disasters.

 Note: This article was first published in the Daily Times

Pakistan: Will the nightmare end?

By S P SETH

Even as the US and Pakistan are trying to sort out serious problems in their relationship, Pakistan continues to have a terrible image internationally. Among other things, the ghost of Osama bin Laden continues to haunt Pakistan at two levels. First is the fact that bin Laden was living in Pakistan for quite some years in different locations but principally in Abbottabad since 2005. The authorities in Pakistan have denied any knowledge of it, but without much effect. Second: the American commando operation to kill Osama bin Laden, without the knowledge and consent of Pakistan, was disastrous for the army as they failed to detect or react to the US’ daredevil operation. Since that time, Pakistan’s military brass has been on the defensive in terms of their public image.

Pakistan’s problems, though, are much deeper. At a basic level, it hasn’t been able to articulate, since its inception in 1947, what the new country is about. True, it would be a country where the Muslims of the sub-continent could pursue their destiny without the danger of domination and discrimination in a Hindu-majority India. That might have been an effective and successful strategy for the creation of the new country but certainly wasn’t a blueprint or vision of how and where to go after Pakistan’s creation. Without it, the only familiar path was the continuation of the old internal politics of the sub-continent of communal baiting and hating but now with more dangerous external ramifications by virtue of there being now two countries instead of one.

In any case, the religion was supposed to be the unifying link for the new country, and Urdu its national language. On both counts, it didn’t work. This was evident in the case of East Pakistan. The first popular protests there were against the imposition of Urdu as a national language. The common factor of shared religion failed to subsume other particularities of language, culture, ethnicity and sectarian identity. While linguistic and regional factors trumped a common religion resulting in the birth of a new nation of Bangladesh, Balochistan to this day is fighting for its regional and ethnic identity. In other words, the over-emphasis on religion as a unifying factor has been counter-productive.

At another level, national leadership of new Pakistan was drawn largely from the regions that remained with India. With leaders like Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan, with their national stature and national constituency, it was not a problem. But after they passed away, the refugee population that migrated from India started to feel, at times, a bit rudderless in a Pakistan where they were not part of the local scene. At times they felt like strangers in a new country with very little access to local and regional leadership. In Karachi, for instance, with a fairly large presence of refugees this sense of political alienation led to the rise of the MQM premised largely on creating and asserting a distinct identity and demand for their own political space. Which has, in turn, led to frequent violent clashes. Karachi indeed has become a city of opposing forces of all sorts with drugs and guns interspersed with religious extremism and militancy.

Even as Pakistan was seeking to come to terms with the loss of East Pakistan and the creation of the new state of Bangladesh, the military coup led by General Zia ul Haq formalized Pakistan’s Islamic character with new laws enshrining the supremacy of the religious over the secular. Among other things, the penal provisions of the blasphemy law made minorities a hostage to allegations of blasphemy with no way of defending themselves. And when Salmaan Taseer sought to highlight the need for amending the law, he paid the ultimate price by being gunned down for taking a stand. Another prominent casualty was Shahbaz Bhatti, the minorities’ minister. And in each case the political establishment retreated, thus making extremist killers the arbiters of Pakistan’s governance, at least when their version of religion was challenged.

In seeking to create a political constituency for his military rule, Zia gave respectability to Islamic parties and politics. It is noteworthy that in electoral politics, whenever elections were held, Islamic parties never voted well. People seemed to make a distinction of sorts between secular politics and religious practice. Not only did Zia give respectability to political Islam by his espousal of Islamic politics and practice, as army chief he also, wittingly or unwittingly, injected ideological Islam into the armed forces. Its consequences in undermining the army discipline and chain of command might not appear disastrous for the time being, but what happened at the Karachi naval base recently is a pointer to what could go wrong.

Another disastrous Zia legacy is Pakistan’s cooption into Afghanistan against the Soviet invasion of the country. Funded by US aid and weapons, Pakistan became the launching pad for insurgency against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Even though the Soviet Union was forced to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan, it had disastrous long-term effects on Pakistan. First: with the struggle against the Soviet forces taking the character of a religious crusade against Godless communists (pushed by the US and its Gulf allies), both Afghanistan and Pakistan were right into the middle of religious extremism. And when the Taliban prevailed in the post-Soviet civil war in Afghanistan with Pakistan’s support, they became the tail that wagged the dog, in turn spawning Pakistan’s own Taliban version. Second: the Kalashnikov culture of Afghan society, an outgrowth of long-term conflict and civil war in the country, had serious ripple effects in Pakistan still being played out. The virtual Soviet defeat in Afghanistan emboldened the Taliban to create a nexus with the al Qaeda which led to the 9/11 disaster and the subsequent US invasion of Afghanistan. The rest of the story is still developing.

The point is that from the time of Zia ul Haq Pakistan has found itself increasingly over-extended in religious extremism. And it doesn’t look like it has a happy end. Already, we have Imran Khan, the presumptive prime minister and self-proclaimed savior of the country, talking of an Islamic welfare state (whatever that means), and ridding the country of terrorism through discussion and dialogue with the Taliban. He believes that once the American troops withdraw from Afghanistan and Pakistan recovers its full sovereignty, the Taliban and their Pakistani cousins will have no cause for violence.

One of the worst things for any country is the prospect or reality of a born-again (in religious terms) leader. Because: that is a prescription for reinventing an imagined past and ignoring the present. And Pakistan needs to face its present seriously and impart its policy a certain secular dimension.

Note: This article was first published in the Daily Times.

Afghan imbroglio

By S P SETH

Some of the recent events in Afghanistan might as well be the script for a horror movie. We have the spectacle of US soldiers urinating on corpses of their Taliban enemy, burning copies of Koran and, the most recent dastardly act of, an American soldier systematically breaking into some Afghan homes and killing family members, including women and children, without any rhyme or reason. The killings are said to be the random acts of a lone US soldier. But try telling this to the Afghan people who detect a pattern in US cruelty with no respect for Afghan lives.

Whatever the explanation, the damage is done with the US headed for exit from Afghanistan, sooner rather than later. The US, in any case, was already looking for a dignified exit by 2014 but that might not be happening now. The Taliban has suspended its tenuous contacts with the US in Qatar, with no new interlocutors in sight in such a charged atmosphere. And Karzai has asked the US to confine its troops to major bases, with a corresponding lull in counter-insurgency operations and nation building tasks for the period ahead. Of course, Karzai doesn’t want to be left behind the Taliban in voicing displeasure and frustration with the US. It is increasingly becoming an untenable situation for the US and NATO military presence in Afghanistan, and how it is sorted out would remain to be seen.

If history is any guide, the British had an awful time in the 19^th century with their recurrent military expeditions into Afghanistan. In 1841, its entire force of 16,500 perished but for one soldier. The Soviet Union’s experience in 1980s was equally ignominious, eventually leading to a humiliating withdrawal after many casualties and lost morale. With some luck the US might stage a more orderly withdrawal and without total humiliation.

Ever since the US surge of 2009 with some initial successes, the military operations in Afghanistan have largely been a holding operation to contain the Taliban. The other two elements of the US strategy---to secure the interior and foster nation building ---have not made much headway. The Taliban were always around, making tactical retreat here and there, with people collaborating with them either out of fear or loyalty. As for raising the new Afghan national army and police forces with funding and training from the US and allies, they are proving highly porous riddled with Taliban influence and volunteers.

Since the US hasn’t really succeeded in creating a popular national Afghan counter-force to the Taliban, the prognosis for the country is for more chaos and bloodshed after the US withdrawal. Because of the Karzai government’s virtually total dependence on US armed presence and funding, it might not take long for the entire edifice to collapse with the new Afghan army splintering into groups fighting for competing power contenders or operating free-lance.

The Karzai government has very little popular support in the country for two good reasons. First: it is seen as American creation and imposition. And second: it is corrupt to the bone. And no matter what Karzai does, now and then, to attack US acts and behavior in Afghanistan, he lacks credibility. And the time is coming when his contradictory, but ineffectual politics of playing all sides of the game, might land him in an awful lot of trouble with no escape hatch.

On surface it might seem that the Taliban will be able to reclaim their lost kingdom in Afghanistan. Earlier they had come on top in the civil war that ensued after the Soviet withdrawal. They had three advantages at that time. First: they had, by and large, a clean image as being free of corruption. Second: after the mayhem of the civil war and lawlessness, their commitment to enforce strict Islamic rule found favor with many Afghans. And third: they had Pakistan’s support for its own strategic reasons, particularly to have a dependent and reliable Afghan regime for, what came to be known, as “defense in depth” against India.

Let us see how far these factors still favor the Taliban. They still are relatively clean compared to the Karzai regime that has become synonymous with corruption. They are likely to have a problem, though, with enforcing strict Islamic rule after the relatively liberal social mores that have developed in some cities, even if they are benefitting only a small class. The limited start to the education of girls is one example. There is also some relaxation of restrictions on entertainment, as with music, films and television. All this is counter to the Taliban precepts and practice, though they are capable of brutal repression.

They still have Pakistan’s support, with their leadership reportedly sheltering in Pakistan. Whether they will do Pakistan’s bidding, when in power, is another thing. It would seem that their rise to power in Afghanistan, after the Soviet withdrawal, did more harm to Pakistan than any good. For one, Pakistani Taliban have been an outgrowth of the Taliban in Afghanistan, with disastrous consequences for the country. Second, their sheltering and support of the al Qaeda leadership, blamed for the 9/11 bombing of the US targets, made Pakistan the witting or unwitting theatre of the US war against Afghanistan. The consequences for Pakistan of all this are still playing out.

In any case, any possible Taliban ascendancy in the post-US Afghanistan is unlikely to bring lasting peace and unity to Afghanistan and, by implication, to Pakistan. At best the Taliban might become dominant in the Pushtun region of the country, setting in motion another civil war against other ethnic and sectarian communities. The Pashtuns, the largest community at 42 per cent, are not the majority. And the Taliban have virtually no support among other sizeable groups of Afghans. The Tajiks are reportedly the second biggest at 27 per cent, followed by Hazaras and Uzbeks at 9 per cent each, with small communities of Aimak (4 per cent), Turkmens (3 per cent) and Baloch (2 percent).

When Afghanistan had some stability under King Zahir Shah, it functioned as a loose coalition of diverse tribes, clans, sects and ethnic groups operating basically as autonomous groups. The overthrow of the King in 1973 by his cousin, Prince Daud, started a chain of events that has meant a continuing state of instability and warfare to this day. Which doesn’t mean that the solution lies in bringing back monarchy. What it means is that any system that tends to centralize authority in Kabul, be it under the Taliban or whatever, will simply prolong Afghan agony. There is need for a flexible and accommodative political dispensation with tolerance in diversity. The Taliban are hardly the kind for a process of national reconciliation and unity, with their ideological and religious rigidity. Not only will they prove divisive in Afghanistan but are likely to plunge even Pakistan further into confusion and chaos.

Note: This article was first published in the daily Times.Afghan imbroglio

By S P SETH

Some of the recent events in Afghanistan might as well be the script for a horror movie. We have the spectacle of US soldiers urinating on corpses of their Taliban enemy, burning copies of Koran and, the most recent dastardly act of, an American soldier systematically breaking into some Afghan homes and killing family members, including women and children, without any rhyme or reason. The killings are said to be the random acts of a lone US soldier. But try telling this to the Afghan people who detect a pattern in US cruelty with no respect for Afghan lives.

Whatever the explanation, the damage is done with the US headed for exit from Afghanistan, sooner rather than later. The US, in any case, was already looking for a dignified exit by 2014 but that might not be happening now. The Taliban has suspended its tenuous contacts with the US in Qatar, with no new interlocutors in sight in such a charged atmosphere. And Karzai has asked the US to confine its troops to major bases, with a corresponding lull in counter-insurgency operations and nation building tasks for the period ahead. Of course, Karzai doesn’t want to be left behind the Taliban in voicing displeasure and frustration with the US. It is increasingly becoming an untenable situation for the US and NATO military presence in Afghanistan, and how it is sorted out would remain to be seen.

If history is any guide, the British had an awful time in the 19^th century with their recurrent military expeditions into Afghanistan. In 1841, its entire force of 16,500 perished but for one soldier. The Soviet Union’s experience in 1980s was equally ignominious, eventually leading to a humiliating withdrawal after many casualties and lost morale. With some luck the US might stage a more orderly withdrawal and without total humiliation.

Ever since the US surge of 2009 with some initial successes, the military operations in Afghanistan have largely been a holding operation to contain the Taliban. The other two elements of the US strategy---to secure the interior and foster nation building ---have not made much headway. The Taliban were always around, making tactical retreat here and there, with people collaborating with them either out of fear or loyalty. As for raising the new Afghan national army and police forces with funding and training from the US and allies, they are proving highly porous riddled with Taliban influence and volunteers.

Since the US hasn’t really succeeded in creating a popular national Afghan counter-force to the Taliban, the prognosis for the country is for more chaos and bloodshed after the US withdrawal. Because of the Karzai government’s virtually total dependence on US armed presence and funding, it might not take long for the entire edifice to collapse with the new Afghan army splintering into groups fighting for competing power contenders or operating free-lance.

The Karzai government has very little popular support in the country for two good reasons. First: it is seen as American creation and imposition. And second: it is corrupt to the bone. And no matter what Karzai does, now and then, to attack US acts and behavior in Afghanistan, he lacks credibility. And the time is coming when his contradictory, but ineffectual politics of playing all sides of the game, might land him in an awful lot of trouble with no escape hatch.

On surface it might seem that the Taliban will be able to reclaim their lost kingdom in Afghanistan. Earlier they had come on top in the civil war that ensued after the Soviet withdrawal. They had three advantages at that time. First: they had, by and large, a clean image as being free of corruption. Second: after the mayhem of the civil war and lawlessness, their commitment to enforce strict Islamic rule found favor with many Afghans. And third: they had Pakistan’s support for its own strategic reasons, particularly to have a dependent and reliable Afghan regime for, what came to be known, as “defense in depth” against India.

Let us see how far these factors still favor the Taliban. They still are relatively clean compared to the Karzai regime that has become synonymous with corruption. They are likely to have a problem, though, with enforcing strict Islamic rule after the relatively liberal social mores that have developed in some cities, even if they are benefitting only a small class. The limited start to the education of girls is one example. There is also some relaxation of restrictions on entertainment, as with music, films and television. All this is counter to the Taliban precepts and practice, though they are capable of brutal repression.

They still have Pakistan’s support, with their leadership reportedly sheltering in Pakistan. Whether they will do Pakistan’s bidding, when in power, is another thing. It would seem that their rise to power in Afghanistan, after the Soviet withdrawal, did more harm to Pakistan than any good. For one, Pakistani Taliban have been an outgrowth of the Taliban in Afghanistan, with disastrous consequences for the country. Second, their sheltering and support of the al Qaeda leadership, blamed for the 9/11 bombing of the US targets, made Pakistan the witting or unwitting theatre of the US war against Afghanistan. The consequences for Pakistan of all this are still playing out.

In any case, any possible Taliban ascendancy in the post-US Afghanistan is unlikely to bring lasting peace and unity to Afghanistan and, by implication, to Pakistan. At best the Taliban might become dominant in the Pushtun region of the country, setting in motion another civil war against other ethnic and sectarian communities. The Pashtuns, the largest community at 42 per cent, are not the majority. And the Taliban have virtually no support among other sizeable groups of Afghans. The Tajiks are reportedly the second biggest at 27 per cent, followed by Hazaras and Uzbeks at 9 per cent each, with small communities of Aimak (4 per cent), Turkmens (3 per cent) and Baloch (2 percent).

When Afghanistan had some stability under King Zahir Shah, it functioned as a loose coalition of diverse tribes, clans, sects and ethnic groups operating basically as autonomous groups. The overthrow of the King in 1973 by his cousin, Prince Daud, started a chain of events that has meant a continuing state of instability and warfare to this day. Which doesn’t mean that the solution lies in bringing back monarchy. What it means is that any system that tends to centralize authority in Kabul, be it under the Taliban or whatever, will simply prolong Afghan agony. There is need for a flexible and accommodative political dispensation with tolerance in diversity. The Taliban are hardly the kind for a process of national reconciliation and unity, with their ideological and religious rigidity. Not only will they prove divisive in Afghanistan but are likely to plunge even Pakistan further into confusion and chaos.

Note: This article was first published in the Daily Times.

Imran Khan as a Revolutionary?

By S P SETH

If Imran Khan-led Tehreek-e-Insaf is Pakistan’s answer to the Arab Spring, it doesn’t quite resonate. The former cricket celebrity, and playboy, has re-invented himself as a politician aiming to be the country’s prime minister. And if recent popular rallies, addressed by him in Pakistan’s major cities of Lahore and Karachi is any indication, he is probably the most popular politician in the country at the present time. But that doesn’t necessarily translate into electoral victory because he lacks the experience and skills of working the feudal, tribal and industrial network that delivers block votes. Precisely because of this, he doesn’t have the access to money politics that is very handy at the time of elections.

But he has one advantage. Which is that he is personally not tainted by corruption. That is why his campaign to rid the country of corruption, so entrenched in Pakistan, creates such enthusiasm among the young and the old in the country. His cricket legend is a hit with the youth of the country, even though they might have been too young to watch his team’s 1992 World Cup victory against England played in Australia. This seems even more spectacular against the backdrop of match fixing scandals that has brought considerable disrepute to Pakistan’s cricket. Therefore, among the youth attracted to his rallies, there is a mystery and magnetism about this new political star on the country’s horizon. However, the captaincy of a cricket team is not the same as running the country, beset with all sorts of problems that do not need enumeration.

Although Imran is clean, his politics is not so straightforward. A man of his background living in both Islamic and Western cultures, and now leaning towards religious conservatism, is a contradiction. Such metamorphism can only be described as political opportunism. His sympathies are more with the religious right, earning him, in some quarters, the title of Taliban Khan. He believes that the country’s militants can be won over through talks. He is pushing the popular anti-US line, advocates freeing Pakistan of US and western aid, and drawing closer to China. Which is all fine. But he is sketchy on how all this will solve the country’s myriad problems. There is a certain political naivety about the man. There are no detailed policy prescriptions to take the country ahead. To take one important aspect: has he got a policy framework to conduct dialogue with the Taliban? How will they be accommodated? Will a prime minister Imran Khan agree to run the country on the Taliban’s interpretation of Islam? There is no clarity about the path Pakistan will tread under him.

Then there is the elephant in the room: Pakistan’s military. Pakistan’s generals are unhappy, rather furious, with the present government. And they are not enamored of Nawaz Sharif either. Nawaz sought to sack Musharraf as army chief when he was Prime Minister. That resulted in his being exiled to Saudi Arabia, and the beginning of Musharraf ‘s long dictatorship. Since then, he hasn’t been the army’s preferred candidate.

But Imran Khan is reported to be the army’s preferred candidate. And he is said to be to be close to the former ISI chief, General Hamid Gul, whose Wahabbist leanings still continue to shape the ideology of many military officers. Gul reportedly played a prominent role in the emergence of the Taliban. If it is true that General Gul is Imran Khan’s political mentor, influencing his sympathies for religious extremism, it is not a good omen for Pakistan already in a vortex of terrorist violence.

Imran Khan’s popularity at home is making him noticed abroad. In an interview with Amanda Hodge of the Australian newspaper in his palatial mountain top house in Islamabad, he catalogued Pakistan’s serious problems. He said, “For the first time people are scared that the country might not survive.” And added, “Almost half of all Pakistanis live below the poverty line and 75 per cent live on $2 or less a day. There is unprecedented inflation, lawlessness, unemployment, gas shortages. There are target killings in Karachi and Balochistan, all along the tribal belt there’s an insurgency and a total collapse of state institutions. Corruption has never been higher…”

He believes this is what is driving people toward him as the savior of Pakistan. He told Bob Doherty of the Sydney Morning Herald, “…This is a movement. It is the sort of soft revolution that no one yet is believing, even when they saw a little of it at the rallies. In the homes there is a revolution going on. Father has belonged to one party, but his wife and children are all coming to Tehreek-e-Insaf. It is the most incredible thing.”

And how will Imran Khan deal with Pakistan’s myriad problems? He is big on eradicating corruption. No one will quibble with him on this. But he has no tangible plan for that. And how will he improve national finances to improve people’s living conditions? His answer: “If the people trust you [as he assumes they trust him], they’ll give you money. If they know that their money will not disappear because of corruption, if they know the leadership themselves give taxes, people will pay taxes….” And his credentials for raising money: “Here, I am someone who raises the most donations in Pakistan. I run the biggest charitable institute. The people will give.” But one can’t run a country like a charitable institute.

In tune with the national mood against the United States, he will refuse any aid from that country. And he will not allow them to carry on drone attacks on and from the Pakistani territory. That is fair enough. But Pakistan, particularly its military, has been dependent on the US aid for many years, nearly $20 billion in the past ten years alone. With his predilection for closer relations with China, he might look to that country to replace the US as an aid donor and more. But that might create a new set of problems. No country is altruistic in the conduct of its national affairs, and China will be no exception.

His makes his pronouncements as self-evident truths requiring no recommendation. Hence, he expects to be the country’s next prime minister. Whether he will win the elections, which might not be far away now that the Supreme Court has given its verdict against Prime Minister Gilani, is debatable. But he is likely to emerge as a major player on Pakistan’s political scene.

One thing that will keep popping up from time to time is the contradiction in Imran Khan’s personal life, that will increasingly become public as he gets closer to the top office. Which is: his increasing reliance on Islamic politics while straddling both sides of cultural divide. Amanda Hodge puts it cryptically in her article in the Australian. She writes: “Despite his best efforts, his previous reputation [as a play boy] hasn’t forsaken him. Rumours abound of Khan--- still slick from a home gym workout --- greeting one female [western] journalist in only a pair of brief running shorts, and of conducting an interview with another in his bedroom.” She adds, “The philandering reputation continues to dog Khan--- and has led some to call into question his attitude towards women.”

Be that as it may, Khan’s Tehreek-e-Insaaf is no revolution--- soft or otherwise.

Note: This article was first published in Daily Times

Pakistan in Crisis

By S P SETH

If media coverage were to rate a country, Pakistan would be one of the top contenders. But it is the kind of coverage that the country could do without, if only its ruling establishment weren’t so bent upon dishing it out. As an example of such bad publicity, here is the opening paragraph of a Sydney Morning Herald editorial. It reads: “As if the lethal opera that is Pakistan—a nuclear armed, basket-case economy with corrupt politicians and an Islamist insurgency—is not bad enough, the country’s military is displaying renewed interest in running the show.” This, in a way, sums up much of the commentary in international media, especially in the West.

The situation is further confounded with the country’s highest judiciary determined to pursue an old corruption scandal that has dogged President Asif Ali Zardari when he was a minister in his late wife, Benazir Bhutto’s cabinet. Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani is charged with contempt of court for ignoring the Supreme Court’s instruction to investigate corruption charges against Zardari. He is alleged to have stashed some $60 million in his Swiss bank account. Gilani’s appearance before the court has taken some heat out of the issue, but it has still to make its findings with the case adjourned till February 1.

At the same time, a judicial commission is investigating the matter of “memogate”, as it is called, where someone high up in the Government---might even be Zardari or someone under his direction--- wrote an anonymous memo seeking US help/intervention to prevent a possible military coup after the US operation that killed Osama bin Laden; with the government undertaking to ensure that the army will duly cooperate in the fight against terrorists.

Of course, Pakistani readers would be familiar (if not over-familiar) with all that is going on. But this raises some pertinent questions. First and the foremost is the judiciary’s role. Pakistan’s highest court gained tremendous public support when it stood up against former President Pervez Musharraf’s bully tactics to cow it down by dismissing the country’s chief justice. The popular protests that followed virtually forced Musharraf into exile. Since then Pakistan’s Supreme Court takes its role as the guardian of the law and order, and the country’s moral conscience, very seriously---no matter how exalted a person(s) position might be. Hence its orders for Prime Minister Gilani to appear before it to answer the charge of contempt.

When he appeared before the court, Gilani reiterated that President Zardari has immunity under law “inside Pakistan, and outside”. But he maintained that “I have no intention to defame or ridicule the court…” The court seems to relish its symbolic victory. According to Justice Saeed Khosa: “This is a great day for the rule of law, when the sitting chief executive has appeared before this court.”

Even as the tussle between the supreme court and the government is still unresolved, the issue of the “memogate” where the army chief is fuming about treason against the military, is hanging like a live grenade. And in both cases, the judiciary will be the arbiter. The Supreme Court and the military brass are angry with the government for contempt of court and the secret memo respectively.

In an odd sort of way, both the judiciary and the military seem to be working toward bringing down the government. However, with the judiciary committed to the rule of law that enshrines civilian supremacy over the armed forces, the supreme court might be trusted to maintain that fundamental principle of democratic functioning.

It is over the top for the generals to brand the said memo as treasonous, as if the military is an autonomous state---if not a supra state. As Akram Zaki, a former Pakistani ambassador to the US has reportedly said: “All politicians of high ambition have been leaning on the US in one way or another for a long time.” In his view, the memo issue has been “blown up beyond all proportion”. There are huge egos at clash, where personalities have become the issues over substance.

The Zardari administration appears highly unpopular, and for good reasons, for failing to deliver the public good. Every day, the Pakistani media is replete with stories of people’s suffering on a whole range issues, like rising unemployment, inflation, falling infrastructure and so on. You name it and it is there. But, according to the basic principle of democratic functioning, it is the court of the people that should decide the fate of any government during elections. If that is adhered to, as it should be, it will be the first time a civilian Pakistani Government would have completed its term of office—a hopeful augury for democratic building in Pakistan.

Even as one examines the present imbroglio in Pakistan, it seems surreal that the Pakistani establishment (the government, judiciary, and the military) is expending so much energy and time into marking their respective boundaries and domains when the country is faced with much more urgent issues that threaten the very state they are part of. The most dangerous of them is the threat from militancy/terrorism. An estimated 3000 people reportedly died from militant violence last year. Even more than the numbers of people killed, and that is substantial, such violence is creating an image of Pakistan as a failing state. And if this continues the image might become a reality.

Against this backdrop, the clash of bruised egos of the personalities involved in this tug of war is a luxury Pakistan can ill afford.

Note: This article was published in the Daily Times.