The stakes are too high in Pakistan

By S.P.SETH

Reports from Pakistan suggest that its military offensive against the Taliban in South Waziristan is making progress. There is, however, no way of assessing the success or otherwise of military operations because, as of now, Pakistan is not allowing media access to the operational area.

It is not unreasonable to surmise, though, that Pakistani troops are having the upper hand. Apart from their large number at 30,000 troops against about 10,000 Taliban fighters, Pakistan military also has the great advantage of superior weapons and technology, access to American satellite intelligence and flow of US weaponry.

Therefore, in any set piece fighting against an insurgent force, a numerically large and better-equipped army is bound to do well, as should be the case with Pakistani troops.

But the Taliban have other advantages. First, the terrain favors them. It is rugged mountainous territory, enabling the Taliban to disperse and re-form in small formations. They are unlikely to be operating in static formations and will have the advantage of surprise and flexibility.

Second, they have imbued themselves as champions of Islam. There is a widespread view in Pakistan that their government and the army establishment are doing the US bidding in taking on the Taliban. The United States is not terribly popular, both with the nationalists and Islamists.

Therefore, even when the Talban are wreaking havoc on the civilian population, people seem to have divided sympathies. Most people don’t like what the Taliban are doing to their own Islamic brothers, but they are also not happy with their government’s perceived coziness with the United States.

Third, the army’s cause is not helped when its military operations lead to the internal displacement of the people in a haphazard and chaotic way. Which only adds to the dissatisfaction of the people, when they have to fend for themselves without adequate help from the state.

In this process, the state is increasingly losing whatever moral authority it had. And when it cannot even protect its own citizens against brazen terrorist attacks in their own towns, it is progressively losing legitimacy.

At a basic level, a state’s legitimacy depends on providing physical security to its citizens, and some sort of economic hope for the future. On both these counts, Pakistan’s establishment (both political and military) has failed.

Its citizens are the targets of random terrorist violence anywhere in the country. And a large number of them have no jobs and no prospects.

No wonder, a good number of them are easy recruiting material for the Taliban and other allied extremist outfits.

There is a terrible disconnect between the establishment and the people at large that simply plays into the hands of the Taliban.

Writing in a mid-year issue of the New York Review of Books, Ahmed Rashid said, “Pakistan is close to the brink…we can expect a slow, insidious, long-burning fuse of fear, terror, and paralysis that the Taliban have lit and the state is unable, and partly unwilling to douse.”

Since then the situation has only worsened, with the terrorists subjecting the country to endless violence. The terrorist bombing in Peshawar is the latest example of this dance of death in Pakistan.

Pakistan was created in the name of religion. But it has failed to forge a common identity, as was demonstrated when Bangladesh was born because of ethnic and cultural reasons.

Now the Taliban are bent on redefining Pakistan in the name of a different brand of Islam. And the way things are going they seem to be setting the agenda by creating mayhem all around. And if they succeed in bringing down the Pakistani state, the implications are horrendous.

Pakistan is a nuclear state. And with the state weakened or simply becoming non-functional, the Taliban might become the new state. And that will give them access to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.

As US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reportedly said last April, “One of our concerns…is that if the worst, the unthinkable were to happen, and this advancing Taliban… were to essentially topple the government for failure to beat them back, then they would have the keys to the nuclear arsenal of Pakistan… we can’t even contemplate that.”

Nor would the rest of the world.

The Nightmare that is Pakistan

By S.P.SETH

One thing the Obama administration has got right is that Afghanistan and Pakistan are intertwined when it comes to insurgency and terrorism in these two countries. But it still doesn’t help much when devising a coherent and effective strategy to deal with the problem.

Lately, the US has come to believe that the Taliban comprises moderates and hardliners. The first group is supposed to owe allegiance to tribal leaders and warlords, who might be swayed (with money and being left alone to exercise power in their respective fiefdoms).

The second group is supposedly much more ideological and fundamentalist, with strong links to the al-Qaeda leadership ensconced in Pakistani territory. Under the new evolving US strategy, the US will go after them by targeted missile attacks from unmanned drone aircraft and the Special Forces operations.

The problem, though, is that there is no such neat division between the moderates and hard line elements in the Taliban. Nothing in Afghanistan and Pakistan is neat and easily identified.

Indeed, the Taliban are trying to take advantage of the confusion in the United States on the ongoing debate regarding the appropriate strategy in Afghanistan. They recently posted a statement on some of their websites asserting that they are simply fighting to expel foreign invaders from Afghanistan, and to establish an Islamic state.

According to the statement, “ We didn’t have any agenda to harm other countries…nor we have such agenda today.”

It added, “If you want to turn the country [Afghanistan] into a colony, then know that we have an unwavering determination and are braced for a prolonged war.”

On surface, the statement seems innocuous enough positing them as a nationalist force trying to free their country of foreign domination and occupation. But their open assertion to establish an Islamic state is not all that innocent.

Going by the recent history of militant Islam and the ongoing crusade to right the wrongs against Muslims all around the world, an activist Islamic state will not be like any other nation state. It will not be a version of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait or any of these Islamic kingdoms that are as much worried about militant Islam as is rest of the world.

Afghanistan will be a radical Islamic state. With both Afghan and Pakistan Taliban being ideological and religious twins, Pakistan will become even more vulnerable to terrorist attacks.

In that sense, the Obama administration has got it right that the danger from Taliban straddles both sides of the border. But the problem is that Pakistan’s establishment, even though aware of the danger, is still refusing to accept that Taliban extremism, militancy and terrorism is an existential threat for the Pakistani state, as it exists.

If any proof were needed, the recent Taliban attack on Pakistan’s military headquarters in Rawalpindi would clinch the issue. The Pakisitani army commandos were able to flush out the Taliban but at not inconsiderable loss of life. More than that, the audacious Taliban attack on Pakistan’s military citadel is a proof of how close the Taliban have come to destabilize the Pakistani state.

But still its military establishment and opinion makers are more worried about the perceived loss of sovereignty from some performance bench marks required by the United States over its much-enhanced 5-year aid package than the existential threat they face from the Taliban.

The US, for instance, is seeking to require a “sustained commitment” against terrorism by way of “ceasing support” to terrorist groups and “dismantling terrorist bases.” The US also requires that the military should not interfere with the country’s civilian political process.

Which doesn’t seem draconian in any sense. Indeed, such commitment against terrorism is in Pakistan’s own interest, considering the way the terrorists can strike at will. The Pakistani establishment does not realize that they need all the help they can get to fight the Taliban.

And one important way of doing this is to improve the people’s living conditions for which they need civilian aid from the United States and other sources.

The majority of Pakistan’s people do not support Taliban or extremist religious parties, as has been demonstrated again and again during elections held now and then; though, lately, there has been some disturbing increase in electoral support for religious parties.

The fact is that people don’t see any hope from the established order to improve their economic and social situation. At the same time, as the Taliban and their associated groups penetrate deeper into Punjab, the heartland of the country, the people are increasingly fearful of them.

The result might be the creeping Talibanization of Pakistan, with the established political order hollowing out from within, and hammered from outside by terrorists.

The sad thing is that it is still not hitting Pakistan’s rulers that they might be on borrowed time, unless they re-think and re-fashion their old hackneyed theories and go all out against the Taliban and their associated terrorist and militant groups. Otherwise, the whole country will end up being a vast terrorist base against the world, with a population of 165 million people. This is what nightmares are made of.

A new US strategy for Afghanistan

By S.P.SETH

As the US casualties in Afghanistan mount, the Afghan war is becoming increasingly unpopular in the United States. The NATO military operations in Afghanistan, with the United States making the largest contribution, is in the midst of a comprehensive re-evaluation by the Obama administration.

Basically, the strategy expounded by General Stanley McChrystal, the US commander in Afghanistan, seeks to restrict military operations to populous areas by providing security to Afghan people; combining it with building up Afghanistan’s military and its institutions. This will also create an environment for Afghanistan’s economic development.

It will be a long-term project to win the people’s hearts and minds, without expending military resources in chasing the Taliban all over the remote and sparsely populated areas of the country.

For this new counter-insurgency strategy to work over a period of time, General McChrystal is seeking additional 40,000 troops over and above the 20,000 already committed by President Obama after coming to power. Which will take the US troop levels to over 100,000 troops.

General McChrystal contends, in his report to Defense Secretary Robert Gates, that without a radical restructuring of US counter-insurgency strategy as he has recommended, the war in Afghanistan “will likely result in failure.”

He has argued that: “Failure to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the near-term [in the next 12 to 18 months] while Afghan security capacity matures risks an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible.”

But, with the new strategy, despite the seriousness of the situation, “success is still achievable.”

In an uncharacteristic way for a military commander, General McChrystal has been making a high pitch publicly for his counter-insurgency strategy that has the effect of making it a political issue in the United States.

He is not only asking for more troops, he is, in fact, asking Americans to completely change their mindset when it concerns US commitment in Afghanistan. To quote him: “We must do things dramatically differently—even uncomfortably differently—to change how we operate and also how we think.”

Furthermore, “Our every action must reflect this change of mindset: how we traverse the country, how we use force and how we partner with the Afghans.”

The fact is, he goes on, “Our campaign in Afghanistan has been historically under-resourced and remains so today. Almost every aspect of our collective effort and associated resourcing has lagged a growing insurgency, historically a recipe for failure in counter-insurgency.”

In his view, “Success is not ensured by additional forces alone but continued under-resourcing will likely cause failure.”

By making his view known through media leaks (whether or not from his side) and by canvassing in public forums, he is not only putting pressure on President Obama but also appears to be promoting a political message.

Not surprisingly, the Republican leadership in the Congress is supporting his blueprint, thus putting President Obama in a difficult situation.

Vice President, Joe Biden, has an alternative option that will restrict US operations to hunting the al Qaeda in the tribal areas bordering Pakistan and Afghanistan and the surrounding region where their leaders are believed to be sheltering.

The emphasis will be more on using drone and similar remote control aircraft, with missiles aimed at al-Qaeda targets.

It is contended that this strategy is already working, with a good number of al-Qaeda leaders killed in these operations.

It is argued that the use of such remote control tactics, combined with Special Forces’ operations, should create better outcomes than spreading out American troops thinly all over Afghanistan. And this might even lead to the withdrawal of some US troops at some point.

The problem with this strategy is that it will be greatly dependent not only on Pakistan’s acquiescence but also its active cooperation, which might be problematic.

Another problem is that it treats al-Qaeda and Taliban too neatly as separate entities with their distinct interests. And it assumes that the Taliban will be responsive to being left alone to pursue their local objective of recapturing power in Afghanistan, while the US goes after the al-Qaeda leadership.

In other words it takes too much for granted in a situation that is so fragile and ever changing.

For instance, Pakistan has tried the strategy of making deals with Taliban and the frontier tribal leadership, but with disastrous results.

As things stand, it seems that President Obama might settle for a hybrid mix of raising troop levels by about 10,000 while, at the same time, pursuing the Joe Biden strategy of concentrating largely on the al-Qaeda threat.

Its rationale being that the Taliban activities is basically a local game, that doesn’t present any direct threat to US security.

It might buy President Obama some time at home, but is unlikely to resolve his dilemma in his “war of necessity” in Afghanistan.

A new US strategy for Afghanistan

By S.P.SETH

As the US casualties in Afghanistan mount, the Afghan war is becoming increasingly unpopular in the United States. The NATO military operations in Afghanistan, with the United States making the largest contribution, is in the midst of a comprehensive re-evaluation by the Obama administration.

Basically, the strategy expounded by General Stanley McChrystal, the US commander in Afghanistan, seeks to restrict military operations to populous areas by providing security to Afghan people; combining it with building up Afghanistan’s military and its institutions. This will also create an environment for Afghanistan’s economic development.

It will be a long-term project to win the people’s hearts and minds, without expending military resources in chasing the Taliban all over the remote and sparsely populated areas of the country.

For this new counter-insurgency strategy to work over a period of time, General McChrystal is seeking additional 40,000 troops over and above the 20,000 already committed by President Obama after coming to power. Which will take the US troop levels to over 100,000 troops.

General McChrystal contends, in his report to Defense Secretary Robert Gates, that without a radical restructuring of US counter-insurgency strategy as he has recommended, the war in Afghanistan “will likely result in failure.”

He has argued that: “Failure to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the near-term [in the next 12 to 18 months] while Afghan security capacity matures risks an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible.”

But, with the new strategy, despite the seriousness of the situation, “success is still achievable.”

In an uncharacteristic way for a military commander, General McChrystal has been making a high pitch publicly for his counter-insurgency strategy that has the effect of making it a political issue in the United States.

He is not only asking for more troops, he is, in fact, asking Americans to completely change their mindset when it concerns US commitment in Afghanistan. To quote him: “We must do things dramatically differently—even uncomfortably differently—to change how we operate and also how we think.”

Furthermore, “Our every action must reflect this change of mindset: how we traverse the country, how we use force and how we partner with the Afghans.”

The fact is, he goes on, “Our campaign in Afghanistan has been historically under-resourced and remains so today. Almost every aspect of our collective effort and associated resourcing has lagged a growing insurgency, historically a recipe for failure in counter-insurgency.”

In his view, “Success is not ensured by additional forces alone but continued under-resourcing will likely cause failure.”

By making his view known through media leaks (whether or not from his side) and by canvassing in public forums, he is not only putting pressure on President Obama but also appears to be promoting a political message.

Not surprisingly, the Republican leadership in the Congress is supporting his blueprint, thus putting President Obama in a difficult situation.

Vice President, Joe Biden, has an alternative option that will restrict US operations to hunting the al Qaeda in the tribal areas bordering Pakistan and Afghanistan and the surrounding region where their leaders are believed to be sheltering.

The emphasis will be more on using drone and similar remote control aircraft, with missiles aimed at al-Qaeda targets.

It is contended that this strategy is already working, with a good number of al-Qaeda leaders killed in these operations.

It is argued that the use of such remote control tactics, combined with Special Forces’ operations, should create better outcomes than spreading out American troops thinly all over Afghanistan. And this might even lead to the withdrawal of some US troops at some point.

The problem with this strategy is that it will be greatly dependent not only on Pakistan’s acquiescence but also its active cooperation, which might be problematic.

Another problem is that it treats al-Qaeda and Taliban too neatly as separate entities with their distinct interests. And it assumes that the Taliban will be responsive to being left alone to pursue their local objective of recapturing power in Afghanistan, while the US goes after the al-Qaeda leadership.

In other words it takes too much for granted in a situation that is so fragile and ever changing.

For instance, Pakistan has tried the strategy of making deals with Taliban and the frontier tribal leadership, but with disastrous results.

As things stand, it seems that President Obama might settle for a hybrid mix of raising troop levels by about 10,000 while, at the same time, pursuing the Joe Biden strategy of concentrating largely on the al-Qaeda threat.

Its rationale being that the Taliban activities is basically a local game, that doesn’t present any direct threat to US security.

It might buy President Obama some time at home, but is unlikely to resolve his dilemma in his “war of necessity” in Afghanistan.

Tackling Terrorism

Pakistan might gain from Indonesia

By S.P.SETH

Despite claims by Pakistan’s President Zardari that his country has, more or less, defeated the Taliban, Pakistan remains most vulnerable to terrorism. Which suggests that there is a terrible disconnect between realities on the ground and wishful thinking on the part of Pakistan’s ruling establishment. And this is the crux of the problem.

In this connection, Pakistan might gain some insights from Indonesia’s experience in dealing with terrorism. Which was highlighted recently in the killing of its top terrorist, Noordin Top.

My analysis below about Indonesia in this respect might prove useful.

Indonesia’s police chief, Bambang Hendarso Danuri, was quite right to express his rejoicings over the killing of Noordin Mohammed Top when he reportedly said, “ This is a month full of blessings.” Indeed, it seemed like divine intervention to put an end to the orgy of death and destruction perpetrated by Noordin and his cohorts.

By eluding the police for so long, he had not only created a legend about his invincibility but for some a belief that he was on a divine mission to save Islam. His death has put paid to that myth, though he will be celebrated by militants and jihadists as a martyr of sorts.

The debunking of this mythology is important to reduce the allure for new adherents of somehow becoming part of a higher cause. What it means is until someone else is able to develop that kind of halo and mythology, the terrorist network in Indonesia is truly disrupted and greatly damaged.

In Indonesia where there is a very small pool of believers in the cause (that Islam is in danger), this loss is not going to be easily rectified, if at all.

It is generally acknowledged that Indonesia, under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, has done a tremendous job of going after the terrorist network. His re-election as President somehow was dimmed a bit when two Jakarta hotels were bombed about the time when Indonesia experienced the best demonstration of its democratic functioning in free and fair elections.

Noordin’s death, in a highly successful counter-terrorist operation is, therefore timely to almost coincide with SBY’s second term. But, rightly, SBY is not calling it an outright victory, although conceding that the terrorist threat has been “seriously reduced” with Noordin’s death.

As Susilo said, “…we have won a battle” but not yet the war against terrorism. In other words, Indonesia cannot become complacent. It has to continue to hunt the militant networks through better intelligence and follow up police operations.

And for any of this to work effectively, the authorities need to rely on the support and cooperation of the people. In this respect Indonesia is fortunate, as compared to some other Muslim countries, because it doesn’t have a culture of religious extremism—apart from elements on the periphery of the society.

A big problem, though, is that even a relatively small number of ideologically indoctrinated militants can create mayhem by positing that their religion is in extreme danger. And the simplicity of that message can resonate with some people, especially when the message is couched in interpretations from the Holy Book and propagated in some of the pesantrens (boarding schools).

And this can only be countered through widely disseminated education and information from public channels and educational institutions. Besides, there is need to tackle the “ignorance and poverty “ that underpins terrorism.

Jakarta is sometimes criticized for not earnestly fighting the extremist ideology by letting people like Abu Bakar Bashir, Jemaah Islamiah and other similar outfits continue to promote their hateful ideology of Islamic extremism. Undoubtedly, the government can do more to combat this.

The problem, though, is that those making such criticism are short on suggesting specific measures to deal with it. Any measures to outrightly ban such ideological extremism can sometimes be counter-productive by driving its proponents and others underground. And that can make tracking them that much harder. Besides, it tends to create a halo of sorts around them.

Another criticism centers on releasing imprisoned militants into the society after they have served their sentences. Undoubtedly, some of them might drift again into their familiar outfits and roles. But any policy that suggests locking them up forever even when they have shown signs of rehabilitation, will be lacking in necessary flexibility to deal with extremism.

Noordin Top’s death in counter-terrorism operations is certainly a significant development and achievement. However, though Noordin was a major figure in the terrorist pantheon in Indonesia and South East Asia in general, he was no Osama bin Laden as the ideological fountainhead of global terrorism. We should, therefore, keep that in perspective while evaluating his terrorist role.

By the same token, we should thank the Lord that Noordin wasn’t another Osama bin Laden.

Time is not on US side in Afghanistan

By S.P.SETH

The United States is in the midst of reappraising its military strategy to combat the Taliban threat in Afghanistan. Based on General Stanley McChrystal’s report, who heads the 100,000-strong NATO force (more than two-thirds Americans) in Afghanistan, the emphasis will be more on securing the population than engaging and chasing Taliban insurgents across the country’s wild and far-flung terrain.

There is a growing realization that the United States is not winning the war, but the situation is not yet hopeless and can be turned around. The report says, “The situation in Afghanistan is serious but success is achievable and demands a revised implementation strategy, commitment and resolve, and increased unity of effort.”

Two cardinal features of the proposed new strategy are: (i) to put more focus on securing population centers, as well as reducing civilian casualties from wild air strikes on suspected Taliban. In other words, NATO forces must become people friendly and development-oriented.

The recent air strikes hitting two NATO oil tankers, hijacked by the Taliban, have killed many civilians creating even greater anger against foreign forces in Afghanistan. Which is not a good sign for the unfolding policy.

At the operational level, it is felt that there should be greater flexibility in tasks assigned to different national components of the NATO forces. At present, only American and British troops seem to be doing much of the heavy fighting and suffering high casualties in the process.

Another feature of the new strategy is to expand the role of the Afghan troops through increased numbers and better training. The idea being that they will incrementally take over from the American forces.

But, in the interim period, the United States will pour in more troops in Afghanistan, estimated at about another 20,000. With this, the US contribution will rise to nearly 90, 000 troops, with the total NATO strength rising to 120,000 or more.

Which takes the number closer to the Soviet troop strength at the height of their occupation and eventual retreat. It is certainly an uncomfortable juxtaposition.

America’s Afghan operations increasingly look like another Vietnam in the making or the Soviet disaster. And it is tending to become Obama’s war.

Even the most comfortable assessment of the Afghan war by General McChrystal regards the situation as “serious” but capable of being turned around.

That is where the problem arises. Because all the assumptions of the new strategy are based on the idea that there is a functioning government in Afghanistan with institutional mechanisms in place to create and train an Afghan army under a chain of command and answering to an established civilian government.

This is more a cherished idea than a reality.

Afghanistan doesn’t have a legitimate functioning government. The chaos of the elections simply reinforces this reality.

And without a functioning government, any Afghan army will be a ragtag arrangement, which will disintegrate with the first whiff of American disengagement.

Time is not on America’s side. They are talking of turning the war around within a year or two. The counter-insurgency experts, on the other hand, put the time frame of at least a decade.

The war is becoming increasingly unpopular in the United States. Some estimates put the daily cost for the United States at $100 million a day. Even at the best of times, such outlays, combined with increasing casualties and with no exit strategy in sight, is not sustainable.

And these are not the best of times. The United States is in the midst of a worst recession since the thirties’ depression and its public debt is rising exponentially.

As things stand, the only sensible choice is to deal with terrorism not by occupying other countries and getting bogged down, but by a combination of deploying rapid reaction forces to deal with external threats and internal vigilance.

A new strategy to fight Taliban in Pakistan

By S.P.SETH

The Taliban in Pakistan have regrouped after their leader, Baitullah Mehsud, was killed in an American missile attack. In the Swat valley, where they suffered serious setbacks in Pakistani military operations, they have since staged a number of suicide attacks killing many innocent people.

And they have also blown up a number of NATO supply trucks meant for the troops across the border in Afghanistan.

In other words, they are back in business, if they were ever out of it. The wishful thinking that Pakistan military can eradicate the Taliban is at the core of the problem.

In Swat, the military apparently had popular support. But the displacement of people from their homes did much to erode popular support. Now many of these displaced people have been pushed back to their homes. However, they lack economic opportunities compounded by lack of security. The Taliban still seem able to run havoc at a time and place of their choosing.

Which brings us to the fundamental question: is there a military solution to the Taliban insurgency? Obviously, the answer, based on experience so far of the Pakistani military operations, has to be in the negative.

Which doesn’t mean that a military response to the Taliban threat is entirely redundant. What it means is that the military response needs to be reworked and retooled. And it needs to be integrated with reworking the country’s civilian system.

Regarding the first: considering that the greatest danger to the state comes from the Taliban, the country’s military establishment, its force structure, military doctrine and national ethos need a complete overhaul to reflect the existential threat from the Taliban insurgency.

What it means is that Pakistan’s obsession with a security threat from India is in need of a fundamental reassessment. If that were done, all sorts of possibilities will open up.

First: it will de-emphasize the religious factor in Pakistani polity and identity. Pakistan sees its identity as a Muslim state in opposition to Hindu India, even though India is a secular state with around 160 million Muslims— almost as many as in Pakistan.

Because Pakistan was created out of India as a Muslim state, the religious politics of undivided India was externalized with the country’s partition in 1947. And that remains a constant in Pakistan’s politics, with that country’s never-ending quest for security against an Indian threat.

If Pakistan were to get out of this mind-set, it will become easier to rework the country’s military profile, with more emphasis on fighting the Taliban insurgency.

Second: with the reorientation of the military profile to fight insurgency, there will be considerable scope to reduce military expenditure designed to fight a conventional war with India.

Third: any credible movement in Pakistan to revise its military profile, now focused on an Indian threat, will open up vast opportunities of fruitful cooperation between the two countries in all directions—trade, cultural, political, military exchanges and so on. This will have a flow on effect on all aspects of national life.

However, any reorientation of Pakistan’s military strategy will not work by itself unless it is combined with a simultaneous effort to rebuild society.

Pakistan is plagued with mass illiteracy as there is not much left in the national coffers for education or other nation-building activities, with military hogging the lion’s share of the national resources.

The religious schools (madrasas) have cropped up everywhere with their free tuition and boarding, and a strict diet of Islamic education.

No wonder, Pakistan has so many young students from these madrasas lining up to become Taliban activists and martyrs. With such over-supply, they are even able to supplement the Afghan Taliban on their murderous course.

In a country where people, by and large, have no hope, the call for Jihad appears to have a transcendental message of rising above all “petty” worldly considerations and aim straight for martyrdom and paradise.

Therefore, to create an alternative message of hope, Pakistan’s establishment not only needs to revise its military profile to focus on the Taliban insurgency, but also to combine it with rebuilding the country’s social infrastructure.

And in this, Pakistan will be able to get considerable support and aid from the international community.

US shouldn’t get bogged down in Afghanistan

By S.P.SETH

Even as Pakistan grapples with its own Taliban insurgency (the young 28-year old Mehsud, the new leader, is expected to be even more blood-thirsty than his recently killed predecessor), much of the world is awaiting the final outcome in Afghanistan.

The elections, of course, are important but they are not going to really solve Afghanistan’s intractable problems. By holding elections, the international force there is sending a message to the Taliban.

Which is that, despite the Taliban’s efforts to disrupt and destroy, the United States and its allies are determined to stay the course and make Afghanistan a functioning state under a democratic system—however imperfect.

The Taliban, on the other hand, are doing their utmost to create anarchy. They are not interested, at the present time, to capture power. Their objective is to create fear and lawlessness and thus destroy people’s confidence in the regime and the evolving new system.

Without a sense of security in the country, the Afghan government, propped up by external forces, lacks credibility. And elections lack sufficient legitimacy going by the reports of electoral fraud, and very low turnout, particularly in the Pashtun-populated southern and eastern region of the country.

The Pashtuns are the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan. President Karzai is one of them. But Karzai clan is steeped deep in corruption and unholy political alliances with unsavory warlords.

Afghanistan, at times, looks like a lost cause.

President Barack Obama has made Afghanistan his project. He has described Afghanistan as a “war of necessity” rather than a “war of choice”.

As he has explained, “If left unchecked, the Taliban insurgency will mean an even larger safe haven from which al-Qaeda would plot to kill Americans. So this is not only a war worth fighting. This is fundamental to the defense of our people.”

It is true that Taliban and al-Qaeda are a serious terrorist threat. But are they such a serious threat requiring the United States to commit large scale armed operations over an extended period of time lasting ten and even more years of military entanglement in Afghanistan and Pakistan?

If that is the case, will the United States and its allies have the patience and the popular support to dig in for that long? Even if they do, what are their plans for Afghanistan’s future, if they do last that long?

It is not just the stamina and staying power of the US-led international force that is a question mark. It is also whether they can afford (in economic terms) a long war in far away region, in the midst of the worst financial crisis since the 1930s Depression.

And is it worth bleeding white and, in the process, losing the United States’ position as the world’s primary superpower?

China has already emerged as a challenger in the midst of Bush’s war on terror. And to be bogged down now in Afghanistan (with Iraq still in intensive care) will seriously damage the United States’ global status.

What it means is that terrorism need not become the primary focus of US strategy. It should be dealt with in a phased manner, without getting bogged down in Afghanistan through a preponderant military presence in that country, especially when it is probably part of the problem rather its solution.

Pakistan’s Nuclear Facilities Targeted

By S.P.SETH

There are some disturbing reports that the Taliban and al-Qaeda attacked Pakistan’s nuclear weapons bases in the past two years. A recently published British House of Commons foreign affairs select committee report has suggested that al-Qaeda, which has shifted its strategic focus to Pakistan, might seek to gain access to Islamabad’s nuclear weapons.

At about the same time, some academics have actually identified the sites that were attacked. In his paper published by the US West Point Military Academy, Professor Shaun Gregory, Director of Pakistan Security Research Unit at Bradford University, has detailed three attacks. And he fears that there might be more in the future.

Dr Anupam Srivasava, Director at the Centre for International Trade and Security at Georgia University, believes that there have been more than three attacks on Pakistan’s nuclear facilities. In one such attack on Wah, one of Pakistan’s main nuclear assembly plants, 63 people were killed, though the target at the time was referred to as a conventional weapons factory.

If these reports are true (and they come from multiple sources), Pakistan is truly becoming the focal point of Taliban and al-Qaeda activity.

Hillary Clinton, US secretary of State, also recently highlighted the danger of nuclear weapons in Pakistan falling into the hands of these elements.

Such danger arises because the Pakistani state is increasingly being corroded from within. President Asif Ali Zardari recently said, “We are not a failed state yet but we may become one in ten years if we don’t receive international support to combat the Taliban threat.”

His contention is that, “…we have no money to arm the police or fund development, give jobs or revive economy. What are we supposed to do?”

It is an extraordinary public statement from Pakistan’s president, even though its context was to demand more funds from the United States and other rich countries.

The point, though, is that Pakistan received about $12 billion from the United States under former president Bush. But there is no accounting of where all that money has gone.

The reports suggest that 80 per cent of $12 billion went to the army. And the army (Pakistan’s military establishment which has ruled the country directly or indirectly for all these years) spent much of it buying weapons for use against India. Again, there is no accounting.

In other words, even with funds coming from the United States and elsewhere as under the Bush administration, there is no action plan about how the money will be spent. Ther are no plans to revamp the country’s economy, create jobs, provide education and create health clinics for the people.

Even faced with the most dire existential crisis, Pakistan’s establishment still sees India as its major security threat.

In a recent article, “Pakistan on the Brink”, in the New York Review of Books, Pakistan’s veteran journalist, Ahmed Rashid, has succinctly summed up Pakistan’s national security goals, as defined by the army.

According to him, “Currently it has two strategic interests. First, it seeks to ensure that a balance of terror and power is maintained with respect to India, and the jihadis are seen as part of this strategy.

Second, the army supports the Afghan Taliaban as a hedge against US withdrawal from Afghanistan and also against Indian influence in Kabul...”

With its strategic priorities focused on India: “Containing the domestic jihadi threat has been a tactical rather than a strategic matter for the army.”

Not surprisingly then, “ there have been bouts of fighting with the militants and also peace deals with them; and these have been interspersed with politics of jailing them and freeing them---all part of a complex and duplicitous game.”

No wonder Pakistan is facing an existential crisis. And no wonder that alarms are being raised about the danger of its nuclear weapons falling into the Taliban and al-Qaeda hands!

Pakistan and Palestine

By S.P.SETH

The alleged killing of Baitullah Mehsud, the Taliban tribal leader, has created rejoicing in the Pakistani establishment. And it has equally pleased the United States. Mehsud had united some fragmented Taliban groups, and created them into a force to be reckoned with.

He is said to have been the leading hand behind the assassination of Benazir Bhutto. And he also led his followers to unleash a reign of terror in the Swat valley, thus succeeding in creating a virtual state under the Taliban rule.

His death (from an American drone attack), if confirmed, is, therefore, a cause celebration. It will certainly create disarray among his followers. And there are reports that some of his lieutenants, aspiring to leadership, have started fighting among themselves.

Whether this will weaken the Taliban movement is too early to say.

The problem with such militant movements (like the Taliban and al- Qaeda) is that they derive their sanctity from some fundamental beliefs and religious interpretations, however erroneous. They believe that the God is on their side.

Therefore, despite some temporary setbacks here and there (like Mehsud’s reported death), they fervently believe that the divine nature of their cause is bound to prevail sooner or later.

However, the ferocity of the Taliban cause is frightening Pakistan’s middle and professional classes. The creeping Talibanization of the country is not only threatening their comfortable way of life, but is also becoming physically dangerous. This was dramatized with a string of recent bombing incidents in and around Lahore, regarded as the cultural capital of Pakistan.

These people (from the middle classes) would like to seize the initiative away from the Islamic militants. But they lack credibility because they are regarded as part of the country’s corrupt and venal establishment.

There is one issue where they can seize the initiative. And this is the question of Palestine where, across the board, (irrespective of class, sect and status, as is the case all over the Muslim world) people want to see justice done to the Palestinians.

But Pakistan’s middle class leadership (as elsewhere in the Islamic world) finds itself helpless because of the support for Israel from the Western world. And they are increasingly becoming irrelevant and marginalized by the Islamic militants, with the Taliban seemingly emerging as the champion of their religion and people against powerful forces.

The question is: what is it that makes Israel keep on using the bludgeon in Gaza and West Bank, whenever they feel like? The answer might lie in the psychology of the Israeli state. A letter recently published in the Guardian newspaper about the Israeli invasion of Gaza, signed by more than 300 British academics, put it this way:

“The massacres in Gaza are the latest phase of a war that Israel has been waging against the people of Palestine for more than 60 years. The goal of this war has never changed: to use overwhelming military power to eradicate the Palestinians as a political force, one capable of resisting Israel’s ongoing appropriation of their land and resources.”

The letter goes on, “Israel’s war against the Palestinians has turned Gaza and the West Bank into a pair of gigantic political prisons…”

Israel was created largely as a safe haven for European Jews who had continually suffered horrendous persecution wherever they lived in Europe. They were also subject to discrimination in the United States, sometimes bordering on hysteria.

The holocaust under Hitler was its worst manifestation.

Even during World War 11, when Jews were dispatched to concentration and death camps under Hitler, the allied governments were indifferent to their plight. Indeed, those fleeing such persecution were often received with hostility and put in detention camps.

Not surprisingly then that the United States and Europe welcomed the idea of a Jewish homeland in Palestine (anywhere but in their midst) to atone, as if, for having ignored their sufferings.

The idea of returning to their legendry original home, and the sense of belonging and security this engendered, was highly appealing to Jews all over the world.

The problem, though, was that the Palestinians who had lived in that land for whenever, weren’t considered worth consulting by all the external parties promoting the creation of a homeland for the Jews in their midst.

The Western countries, by now overwhelmed by the centuries’ old accumulative guilt of Jewish persecution, made more poignant by Hitler’s holocaust, found in the creation of Israel a convenient solution to an age-old dilemma.

The creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine had been the Zionist demand for many years. It was given some validity by the Balfour Declaration of 1917. Balfour was the British foreign secretary at the time.

What it all means is that the Jewish state of Israel was foisted on the Palestinian people. And it resulted in the expulsion of many of them (some forced out, while others felt unsafe) to constitute a Palestinian diaspora refusing to accept the loss of their Palestinian identity.

With its preponderant military power and the occupation of more Palestinian territory following the 1967 war, Israel had hoped to create a fait accompli which the Palestinians would have no option but to accept.

But it hasn’t worked out like that, even though Israel was able to break Arab solidarity by signing peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan.

Even the Oslo agreement of 1993, leading Yasser Arafat’s PLO to recognize the state of Israel, did not break the logjam. The building of more and more Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Jerusalem to encircle and dominate the Palestinian territory, and thus effectively negate the prospect of a new state of Palestine, made any real progress virtually impossible.

At its core, the problem is with the psychology of the state of Israel. Because Israel was created in the midst of Arab opposition, it suffers from this deep sense of insecurity being surrounded by hostile Arab populations all around it.

And even with its preponderant military power and support from the United States and much of Europe, this sense of insecurity tends to surface all the time. Hence, Israel keeps making more and more demands on the Arabs and the world community to feel more secure, which is a never-ending process.

For instance, it wants Hamas to recognize Israel’s existence, among other things. But a similar recognition by the PLO under Yasser Arafat didn’t lead to any worthwhile progress towards a Palestinian statehood.

The Palestinians and the Arab world know for sure that the state of Israel is a fact of life, whether they like it or not. For Israel to nurse a perpetual sense of insecurity and to seek iron clad guarantees (non-existent in any situation) will only prolong its agony, and worse still, of the Palestinian people.

A strong power like Israel should work to win the goodwill of the Palestinian people by withdrawing to its pre-1967 borders. Which will immediately unleash all the possibilities inherent in the situation where both sides desperately need peace.

Only a spectacular initiative like this will eventually work. Only Israel can do this because it has taken away so much and can afford to be magnanimous.

In any case, nothing else is working and such an initiative might do the trick over a period of time.

Imagine how empowered the middle and professional classes in Pakistan and Islamic countries will feel to fight off the unrelenting propaganda of the Taliban and al-Qaeda which focuses, among other things, on the injustice of the Palestinian situation.

Pakistan is the Real Issue

By S.P.SETH

There is a growing feeling on the British and US sides that now is the time to start a dialogue with elements of the Taliban in Afghanistan that might be receptive to such approaches.

The argument is that the recent military offensive against the Taliban in the Helmand province has been a success that puts them on the defensive.

Which should encourage the “second-tier” local leaders to come out of the shadow of the “first-tier” leadership of Mullah Omar and his lieutenants.

Indeed, there is reportedly even talk of a military “exit strategy”, reflecting a level of optimism that doesn’t bear scrutiny.

First, this optimism is based on an assumption that the enhanced military action is tipping the balance against the Taliban.

But it doesn’t square with the high level of casualties they are inflicting on the British and American soldiers.

Indeed, the Taliban were able to simultaneously take the offensive in the eastern city of Khost, regarded as relatively stable.

The second assumption is that the Taliban are a divided lot. And these divisions can be usefully exploited, especially when they are under constant military pressure.

Obviously, the Taliban, like any human group, cannot be an entirely cohesive and united force. But most of them have a strong belief that their religion (and traditions and social codes) is under serious threat from Western onslaught.

These untenable and unsustainable assumptions aside, the entire war effort is geared to visualizing Afghanistan as a normal state with its usual apparatus of coercive and persuasive instrumentalities. The elections are part of that process. Another part is to raise and train enough police and military forces to enforce state power.

The point, though, is that in its recent history Afghanistan has never been a ‘normal’ state with established institutions. The only institution that commanded respect and loyalty (through economic largesse and in other ways) was monarchy.

Which also symbolized, to the extent possible, the concept of an Afghan nation as a conglomeration of different ethnic groups and tribes.

But that symbolic unity was shattered when Prince Daud, the king’s cousin, overthrew the monarch in early 70s and deprived the country of its only identifiable symbol of unity of sorts.

Prince Daud’s government, in turn, was overthrown by the communists. And when they got into trouble, the Soviets came in to save their ideological ally.

And we know what happened to the Soviet troops in Afghanistan as the Mujahideen warriors went after them. In these operations, Pakistan worked as a conduit for supplies, weapons, money and whatever else, supplied by the United States, Saudi Arabia and others.Which made Pakistan the frontline state to fight the old Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The Soviet military disaster in Afghanistan further weakened the communist state. And the Soviet Union collapsed a couple of years after its withdrawal from Afghanistan, though that wasn’t the only factor in its demise.

While the US congratulated itself on winning the Cold war in Afghanistan through its proxies, the balance sheet was not as clear-cut.

Take the case of Pakistan. By increasingly depending on its military dictator, General Zia, to prosecute the Mujahideen struggle against the Soviets in Afghanistan, Washington gave his military regime a blank cheque not only in financial terms but also in recasting Pakistan to conform to Islamic tenets of governance.

The Pakistani state, under him, increasingly acquired a religious fervor. Which even started to change the character of the Pakistani military, with its ranks and middle level officers increasingly falling under the sway of religious influence.

And this remains a problem to this day, with its Inter Service Intelligence Agency emerging as the Godfather of the various Mujahideen groups inside Afghanistan and creating new ones within Pakistan to start a proxy war in India’s Kashmir region.

After the Soviet military withdrawal, the Mujahideen groups in Afghanistan started a fratricidal war between themselves to capture power. With Pakistan’s help and blessings, the Taliban came on the top.

And even the US seemed quite satisfied with the outcome, as Washington’s interest and commitment to Afghanistan started to wane.

That was until the 9/11 in 2001 when Washington dramatically discovered (though it was known before) that the Taliban-ruled Afghanistan had become the international headquarters of al Qaeda under Osama bin Laden.

The irony of it all is that after the American military invasion of Afghanistan and the toppling of the Taliban regime, its leading figures, like Mullah Omar and others, took shelter in the border areas of Pakistan.

The Taliban leadership reportedly found shelter in the adjoining areas of Baluchistan, and the al Qaeda supremo, Osama bin Laden and his deputy Zawahri, ensconced themselves in Pakistan’s tribal belt, adjoining the North West Front Province.

Even as the Pakistani army was under attack from the Taliban and its associated elements, it started promoting and implementing the line of differentiating between the Taliban (as the home grown elements that should be cultivated) and the “foreign” al Qaeda elements that should be ostracized and kept at bay.

But this didn’t work as the Taliban and al Qaeda refused to be categorized to suit Pakistan’s convenience.

And this convenience has two main elements. First, Pakistan still wants to keep the Taliban structure intact. They strongly believe that the US cannot sustain its military operations in Afghanistan.

And its eventual withdrawal (sooner rather than later) would bring Taliban back into power in Afghanistan. Which will enable Pakistan to renew its close ties.

With the Taliban back in power, a friendly Afghanistan will give Pakistan its strategic depth against India—its classical enemy.

Any distraction from India tends to give Pakistani establishment its loss of national identity. Without India as an enemy, the Pakistani state would need to redefine the country in terms of serving its people.

And this new definition would also require a bold initiative to redefine relations with India in terms of peaceful co-existence and peaceful cooperation.

This is something to ponder about for the future.

But, in the present context, Pakistan’s continuing softness for the Taliban in Afghanistan has resulted in creating its Pakistani version that has been creeping on it to the point that it is now a serious threat to the Pakistani state.

Pakistan is now caught between the Afghan Taliban and its own home-grown version, both wanting the imposition of Sharia and governance based on their interpretation of Islam.

At the same time, there is an increasing fusion of class and ideology (Islam, as interpreted by the militants). The poor in Pakistan increasingly draw comfort from religion because the Pakistani state has not done much, if anything, to improve their lot. The militants promise them a better (as well as divine) future under their brand of Islamic governance.

Without much access to state education, for many poor people the Islamic madrasas have become their only venue for education. And a good number of their students have become active or sympathetic adherents of the Taliban and/or al Qaeda ideology.

The two are virtually interchangeable—the latter with greater emphasis on international jihad.

It is not to suggest that Pakistani masses are all hell bent on Jihad. Indeed, if electoral statistics are anything to go by (when elections have been held), the Islamic parties haven’t fared terribly well. Though, they have done a bit better recently than earlier times.

Which means that the extremist message is creating resonance, with poverty (class) and ideology (religious extremism) becoming a lethal mix.

At another level, even though Pakistan’s admittedly small middle class is worried about the country’s growing extremist and terrorist culture, they are unable to do much about it. They have been complicit in creating a disproportionate role for the military in the nation’s affairs, without meaning (always) to support military dictatorship. And this has been because of a constant obsession with a military threat from India.

In the skewed priorities of the Pakistani governing class (with military in the leading role), its national budget has neglected vital sectors of nation-building like education, health, job creation and so on.

No wonder, Pakistan’s poor are increasingly becoming the militants’ captive audience and sympathizers’, with a good proportion enlisted in the martyrs’ brigade.

This was graphically brought home the other day in a Four Corners program on the last November’s terrorist attack in Mumbai on the Australian television. The TV footage of the Mumbai carnage, with its visuals and audio (recording the Pakistani handlers’ instructions to the terrorists on the ground in Mumbai), clearly shows the rot that has gripped Pakistan.

Incidentally, the Lashkar-e-Toiba, that sent these terrorists to Mumbai, was created by the Pakistani military and its Inter Service Intelligence to fight its proxy war in Kashmir.

As things stand, any kind of tactical alliance with the so-called moderate, or “second-tier”, Taliban is an oxymoron.

Even though Afghanistan remains the focus of Western military operations, the fact is that it is Pakistan that needs most attention, but not of the military kind. And that attention requires a long-term strategy of redefining, restructuring and transforming Pakistani state and society into an active agent for the well-being of its own people.

Far too long, the United States has used Pakistan for its strategic goals in terms of Cold War and now the war against terror. Of course, Pakistan has actively sought such a role as a counterweight to India.

Unless this mindset is changed, Pakistan will always remain susceptible to such machinations of its governing military-dominated class, and the external forces interested only in pursuing their own interests at any given time.

In the meantime, the Talibanization of the country is maintaining its momentum, with dangerous consequences for the world.