Afghanistan: nightmare continues

S P SETH

There seems a palpable shift in thinking in the US, which would suggest that the US might be in Afghanistan for the long haul. President Obama had come to office to disengage from Afghanistan and Iraq, making sure that in both countries the new political order would be able to sustain itself with their newly US trained and equipped armed forces. When the US forces withdrew from Iraq in 2011, its government under then prime minister Nouri al-Maliki, backed by the country’s American-equipped and trained forces, were somehow believed to be equal to the job in the post-Saddam phase of governance. Now we know that this was not the case. Indeed, what it did was to further accentuate the country’s bloody sectarian divide, out of which has emerged IS. In Afghanistan, the US is following a phased process of disengagement while continuing (with some of its coalition partners) a limited presence of several thousand military advisers, aerial support, enemy surveillance, and, at times, actively engaging to push back Taliban advances and even to help smash an occasional al Qaeda training camp. It was reported some time ago that a company of elite US Rangers helped Afghan forces destroy an al Qaeda training camp in November. This would seem to rekindle memory of similar al Qaeda training camps and 9/11 scenario, which led President Bush to declare a ‘global war on terrorism’.

But between Bush’s ‘global war on terrorism’ and Obama wanting to end this ‘idea of endless war’, the US is still not able to flesh out precisely what to do with the situation in Afghanistan, where the Afghan government do not look like dealing with the enemy on its own. As one senior unnamed Pentagon official was quoted to say, “What we’ve learned is that you can’t really leave [Afghanistan]. The local forces need air support, intelligence and help with logistics. They are not going to be ready in three years or five years. You have to be there for a very long time.” This may not yet be the official policy but a realization is dawning that any definite cut off point for US military involvement in Afghanistan is not workable. The fear, though, still not articulated loudly, is that Afghanistan (and the region bordering Pakistan) could easily turn into a vast camp/sanctuary for terrorist operations.

This was what Brigadier General Wilson Shoffner, a military spokesman, seemed to have in mind when he talked about recent joint US-Afghan operations to destroy an al Qaeda training camp in a “fierce fight” that lasted several days. He reportedly said, according to American news sources, “No matter what happens in the next couple of years, Afghanistan is going to have wide ungoverned spaces that violent extremist organizations can take advantage of.” And he pointed out that, “The camp that developed in south-eastern Kandahar is an example of what can happen.” And in this context of “wide ungoverned spaces”, one cannot rule out an expanding role that IS-inspired and aligned elements in Afghanistan’s somewhat fractured extremist scene might carve out for themselves.

It is early days yet but it would seem that the US might find itself drawn into a long term, yet undefined, commitment to underwrite the Afghan government against Taliban and other extremist elements. In this respect there is already some talk of a US commitment and involvement on the lines of its military presence in South Korea. Whether or not this can be sustained is another thing. However, a US military presence around the present 10,000 number mark might not be too onerous financially, considering the stakes that the US perceives to keep Afghanistan afloat.

Of course, a more durable course is a peace process between the Afghan government and the Taliban. So far, the fitful efforts in this direction have not come to much because there are obvious difficulties. One problem is that any internal resolution, as far the government and the US are concerned, has to be, by and large, within the ambit of the existing constitution that legitimizes the government and the system. The Taliban, somewhat fractured after the news of their leader Mullah Omar’s death was hidden for two years, are averse to dealing with a government that they consider is illegitimate having been installed by the US-led foreign occupation. They would like the US and its coalition partners to quit Afghanistan allowing the country to solve its own problems. Which, in effect, means for Taliban to once again rule the roost, possibly also creating a sanctuary for all sorts of extremist elements like al Qaeda and eventually even IS, emerging out of a fractured post-Mullah Omar Taliban.

It is believed, however, that Pakistan can play a useful role in facilitating a peace process between the Afghan government and the Taliban. It would appear that Pakistan has leverage with elements of the Taliban and might be able to lean on them to be more responsive, especially as its leadership has largely been functioning from its sanctuary in Pakistan after they were hunted out of Afghanistan following the US invasion in October 2001. Now that China has come out in support of a peace dialogue between the Afghan government and the Taliban, there should be greater momentum for this. China obviously has its own interests arising out of ensuring stability on its border with Xinjiang, wracked by a low level insurgency by its Uighur Muslim population to maintain their cultural, religious and ethnic identity. Because of Pakistan’s close relationship with China, it should be particularly susceptible to Beijing’s persuasion/pressure.

It would seem though that in, so many ways, Pakistan itself has become a victim of its support of Taliban. It found itself becoming part of President Bush’s ‘global war on terror’ after 9/11. And that was the result of Afghanistan’s then Taliban regime hosting al Qaeda. Another disastrous consequence for Pakistan has been the emergence of the Pakistani version of Taliban, with its army constantly engaged in trying to snuff it out, unsuccessfully though, from the borderlands between Pakistan and Afghanistan. At the same time, because it has links and influence with the Taliban operating from its sanctuary, its relationship with the Afghan government is marked by great distrust. In the circumstances, any peace process starts with doubts about Pakistan’s sincerity.  

In other words, with Taliban staging a comeback and Afghan military force weak and ineffective, the Afghan government would continue to need US backing to hold back the Taliban. Whether or not US military involvement can be sustained over a longer period is another question. The prognosis, though, for Afghanistan, with or without US presence, is continuing instability with invitation for all sorts of extremist activity, including IS-inspired and aligned elements.

Note: This article was first published in Daily Times.